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ABSTRACT
Nondevelopmental item acquisition represents a viable approach to meet the procurement needs of
the Defense Department. The reduced acquisition cycle time and resultant cost savings of this
acquisition methodology/strategy presents significant potential benefits to the DoD. The objective of
this research was to identify alternative solutions to counter the current impediments to the NDI
acquisition initiatives defined in 10 USC § 2325. The research was conducted by a review of current
and proposed statutes and regulations, as well as previously published materials. Perhaps more
importantly because of the evolving nature of NDI and the acquisition of commercial products in
today's legislative arena, interviews with Defense Department procurement officials, industry
representatives, and a Congressional staff member were conducted. This research provides an
overview of the NDI concept and the problems associated with procuring NDIs. This study analyzed
the major issue of increasing the effectiveness of NDI acquisitions. Major conclusions are: NDI
acquisitions represent a viable means of acquiring goods and services, many impediments (both
statutory and regulatory) continue to exist despite significant study efforts, and lessons learned exist
that may be exploited to facilitate more effective use of NDI acquisitions. Major recommendations
are: increased awareness, training and education is required to shift the acquisition process paradigm;
a more proactive measurement process should be implemented to increase the efficiency of the
process; and legislative changes should incorporate more commercial standards and practices in order
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. AREA OF RESEARCH
A window of opportunity currently exists to exploit the
lessons learned over the past 21 years in the acquisition of
commercial goods and services. While a number of commissions,
panels, and studies have examined the problems facing the
Department of Defense (DoD) and industry in this regard,
little substantive improvements have resulted. This situation
could quite possibly be turned around due in part to the
current Administration's resolve to bolster the integration of
commercial technology into the defense industrial and
technology base [Ref 27:p. 22]. Faced with rapidly declining
budgets and the requirement to remain a supreme superpower,
weapons and materiel must be acquired at the greatest cost
savings while meeting minimum operational requirements.
Likewise, the adequacy of the defense industrial base is a
chief concern in the current downward economic spiral. An
additional catalyst for this shift is the Report of the
Department of Defense Acquisition Law Advisory Panel,
generally known as the Section 800 Panel Report [Ref 10:p. 1].
The Section 800 Panel Report is a comprehensive, fresh new
look at legislation in this and in the entire acquisition
arena. Congress and the Administration have assumed the
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responsibility to analyze the report and take appropriate
legislative action in order to incentivize industry to do
business with DoD. The Senate has introduced the Federal
Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1993 (S 1587) ds its answer to
the panel's recommendations [Ref 26: pp. S14384-S14435].
Reconciliation of the Bill is anticipated to take place by the
end of this Fiscal Year (FY).
A nondevelopmental item (NDI) acquisition represents a
means to the end of acquiring goods and services in an
economical manner while exploiting the commercial marketplace,
as well as other already developed items. An NDI acquisition
represents a new pathway and philosophical shift in the
requirements process and material development [Ref 54: p. 1].
B. OBJECTIVE
The objective of this research is to provide alternatives
to DoD for those non-statutory-related NDI impediments over
which DoD has "control." In doing so, this research will
assess the DoD's compliance with the NDI acquisition
initiatives set forth by Congress in U.S. Code (USC), Title
10, Section 2325 (10 USC S2325) on a macro level. This
assessment will attempt to 1) identify the degree of
compliance with these initiatives by each of the DoD Services,
i.e., U.S. Air Force (USAF), U.S. Army (USA), U.S. Navy (USN),
and U.S. Marine Corps (USMC); 2) identify problems associated
with NDI implementation; and 3) offer alternatives in NDI
2
acquisition implementation, to include sharing lessons learned
by the different Services.
C. RESEARCH QUESTION
1. Primary Research Question
To what extent has the DoD implemented the NDI
acquisition initiatives set forth by Congress in 10 USC S2325?
2. Subsidiary Research Questions
"* What is an NDI acquisition?
"* What are the 10 USC S2325 NDI acquisition initiatives?
"* What are the key impediments in implementing the
10 USC S2325 NDI acquisition initiatives?
"* How can DoD Services overcome these impediments in order
to comply with the Congressional intent of 10 USC S2325?
"* How can DoD Services use lessons learned by other DoD
Services in order to implement these initiatives?
"* Are there specific differences between Services that
prevent the timely implementation of these initiatives?
What are they? (How) can they be overcome?
D. SCOPE OF THESIS
This research will explore the implementation status of
the NDI acquisition initiatives set forth by Congress in 10
USC S2325. First, this research will present a review of the
background and history of NDI acquisitions within the DoD.
Second, it will address associated implementation impediments
encountered by DoD and the actions taken by or required to be
taken by DoD to comply with the Congressional intent of 10 USC
S2325. Third, this report will then identify lessons learned
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by the Services, and finally, present alternatives to help
achieve the NDI acquisition initiatives. This research
assumes a basic understanding of the NDI concept. Therefore,
a comprehensive review of NDI concepts is considered to be
outside the scope of this research. Likewise, this research
will review acquisitions within DoD Services only and will not
review NDI acquisitions of other DoD agencies, e.g., the
Defense Logistics Agency, Defense Contract Audit Agency, etc.
This research was based on a macro-level view held
primarily by proponents of the NDI program, i.e., NDI Advocate
Generals, members of their offices, and those in positions of
direct responsibility for overseeing the implementation of the
NDI acquisition initiatives. These views were specifically
from the Office of Federal Procurement Policy, offices within
the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (OASD) for
Economic Security, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (DUSD)
for Acquisition Reform, the DoD Services, i.e., USAF, USA,
USN, and the USMC, and the Defense Systems Management College
(DSMC). As such, this may portray an overly optimistic
viewpoint to the layman in general; however, this should be
tempered with the fact that NDI acquisitions were mandated by
Congress with passage of the 1987 NDI Preference Act.
Additionally, an industry viewpoint was included to the extent
that the Section 800 Panel was represented by approximately
a 50-50 Government/industry mix of panel members,
consolidated industry association analyses of the Section 800
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Panel Report and the Senate's version of the Federal
Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1993 were reviewed, and
individual industry representatives were queried. Finally, a
professional staff member of the Senate Armed Services
Committee (SASC) provided a legislative viewpoint of the
NDI/commercial product acquisition issue.
E. LITERATURE REVIEW AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The overall research strategy is an archival-based method.
For this research, primary sources consist of personal
interviews and a review of recently released literature on NDI
acquisitions, to include official DoD documents. Secondary
sources consist of publications, reports, and studies on the
subject, many of which were obtained during personal
interviews. The following sources were used in the literature
review search:
"* Defense Logistics Studies Information Exchange (DLSIE)
"* Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC)
"* Air University Periodical Index
"* Defense Systems Management College (DSMC) Catalog
"* Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Economic
Security (Production Resources)
"* DoD Component Competition/NDI Advocate General Offices
F. ABBREVIATIONS
Abbreviations and acronyms may be found in Appendix A.
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0. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY
This thesis is organized in five chapters. The remainder
of this thesis is organized in the following chapters:
"* Chapter II, "Theoretical Framework," which provides a
general background and historical perspective of NDI
acquisition.
"* Chapter III, "A Compendium of Interview Responses," which
provides a compilation of data collected and compendium of
interview responses.
"* Chapter IV, "An Analysis of Critical Issues," which
provides an analysis of the issues and major problems
identified as a result of this research.
"* Chapter V, "Conclusions and Recommendations," which





This chapter provides the theoretical framework for the
research. First, this chapter reviews the historical
background of NDI acquisition in DoD. In doing so, this study
will provide a series of tables consisting of former
commissions, studies, and reports related to the acquisition
of NDI/commercial products. Then a brief overview of several
of the more "significant" studies will be provided in order to
highlight the issues, concerns, and recommendations of the
period. Second, the chapter provides a definition of NDI and
identifies concepts, benefits and challenges of NDI. Finally,
the chapter indicates impediments associated with NDI
acquisitions.
B. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
There have been numerous commissions, studies, and reports
in regard to NDI over the past two decades. In December 1972,
the Commission on Government Procurement (COGP) recommended
that the Government should take greater advantage of the
efficiencies offered by the commercial market [Ref 24:p. 103].
In 1973, the Defense Science Board (DSB) released its
report, "Design-to-Cost, Commercial Practice vs. DoD
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Practice." As a result of the board's deliberations several
recommendations were forwarded, including:
The implementation of the essence of commercial practice
within the DoD-defense-industry environment requires a
comprehensive change, rather than the selective
implementation of a few isolated recommendations ....
Principal recommendations included:
... 4) That specifications be more nearly limited to "end-
item" orientation, including performance, environment, and
long-term warranty or service policy. That the thousands
of detailed "how to do it" specifications be reduced, and
in many cases eliminated.
... 7) That for non-weapon procurement, a greater use of
commercial products be made [Ref 8:pp. xvi, xvii].
The DoD attempted to promote the greater use of commercial
products in several programs during the latter part of the
1970s. The Commercial Commodity Program, the Commercial
Commodity Acquisition Program (CCAP), the Commercial Item
Support Program (CISP), and the Acquisition and Distribution
of Commercial Products (ADCoP) program were attempts by the
DoD to capitalize on the acquisition of commercial products
which had an established commercial market acceptability.
Additionally, the ADCoP established the use of Commercial Item
Descriptions (CIDs) as tl-! preferred way to acquire commercial
items [Ref 1:p. 6]. Du' s intent was to streamline and tailor
the acquisition process and reduce or eliminate unnecessary
Government specifications. Table 1 chronicles these efforts
during the 1970s.
TABLE I
COMMISSIONS, REPORTS, STUDIES, ETC.
RELATED TO COMMERCIAL ACQUISITIONS
(1970s)
DATE TITLE
December 1972 COGP: Acquisition of Commercial
Products
March 1973 DSB: Reducing Costs of Defense Systems
Acquisition
December 1975 DoD announces establishment of the
Commercial Commodity Program
April 1976 DoD announces establishment of the
Commercial Commodity Acquisition Program
(CCAP)
May 1976 OFPP Memoranda to DoD, GSA, VA
establishing Government policy--
encourage acquisition & distribution of
commercial products (ADCoP)
December 1976 DSB: Electronic Equipment
November 1977 GAO: Government Specifications for
Commercial Products-Necessary or a
Wasted Product
November 1977 DoD establishes the Commercial Item
Support Program (CISP)
December 1977 OFPP Memorandum: Implementation of
Policy on ADCoP
June 1978 DoD begins "specification review" effort
IRT OFPP's Dec 1977 Memorandum
December 1979 DUSD Memorandum: Implementation of
ADCoP Policies
SOURCE: Developed by researcher.
DoD's intent was to streamline and tailor the acquisition
process and reduce or eliminate unnecessary Government
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specifications. However, the program's efforts were
frustrated in two ways:
1) efforts did not have the force of law; and
2) the requirement met with considerable opposition from
companies (mostly small businesses) whose sales were
exclusively or primarily to the Federal Government [Ref 1:
p. 6].
Since that time, the Defense Science Board (DSB), General
Accounting Office (GAO), and Office of Federal Procurement
Policy (OFPP) are among a long list of agencies whose studies
of NDI-related acquisition have gained attention. In response
to small business concerns about commerciality requirements,
Congressional hearings took place between 1980 and 1982.
These hearings resulted in language to protect small
businesses within the 1983 Supplemental Appropriations Act.
In June 1986 the President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense
Management, also known as the Packard Commission, issued its
final report, "A Quest for Excellence." The primary
recommendation in regard to NDI was to expand the use of
commercial products. Specifically, the report stated:
Rather than relying on excessively rigid military
specifications, DoD should make greater use of components,
systems, and services available "off-the-shelf." It
should develop new or custom-made items only when it has
established that those readily available are clearly
inadequate to meet military requirements [Ref 24:pp.
14,15].
In addition, a proposed legal framework to expand the use of
commercial products and "commercial-style" acquisition
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techniques in Defense procurement was set forth [Ref 24:pp.
71-96]. The culmination of these and former efforts in this
regard resulted in the Congress passing legislation
establishing a formal preference for NDI acquisitions.
Section 907 of Public Law (P.L.) 99-591, the 1987 DoD
Authorization Act, established a statutory preference for the
acquisition of NDI by the DoD. This preference has since been
codified and is contained in 10 USC S2325 (Appendix B). In
addition to providing the force of law, the section
established required initiatives for DoD to comply with, a
universal definition of the term NDI, and the requirement for
DoD to prescribe regulations to carry out the section and
identify and remove impediments to the acquisition of NDI.
These initiatives may be found in 10 USC S2325 (Appendix B).
In February, 1989, the General Accounting Office (GAO)
released a report, "DoD Efforts Relating to NDI," which among
other things, listed nine claimed impediments to the
acquisition of NDI. Likewise, during 1989, the Senate
Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on Oversight of Government
Management interviewed industry representatives on the DoD's
progress in reducing impediments to NDI acquisitions. Many
specific examples of DoD's failures in this area were provided
by contractors. Contract clause requirements, specifications,
and regulations were cited as the primary causes of these
problems. As a result of these hearings four significant
11
impediments to the acquisition of NDIs were identified. They
included:
1) inappropriate product descriptions and specifications;
2) unnecessary and burdensome contract terms and
conditions
3) inappropriate requests for certified cost or pricing
data; and
4) unnecessarily burdensome quality assurance requirements
[Ref 1:p. 8).
Later in 1989, the Defense Management Report (DMR) was
issued. It recognized previous findings in the NDI arena and
attempts by former commissions to enhance the acquisition of
NDI. It recommended two legislative proposals dealing with
NDI:
First, the Commercial Products Act of 1989 authorized
procurement of such products under simplified competitive
procedures; and Second, a Commercial Acquisition Pilot
Program Act was established to demonstrate advantages by
adopting a full range of commercial style buying practices
(Ref 1:p. 8].
These recommendations, once implemented, will contribute to
the anticipated savings of $70 billion by 1999, with more than
$15 billion a year in recurring savings therea-ýýer [Ref 38:
P. viii3.
Finally, the National Defense Authorization Act for 1990
and 1991 (P.L. 101-189) enacted in November 1989 established
the requirement for NDI training. Table 2 outlines the




COMISSIONS, REPORTS, STUDIES, ETC.
RELATED TO COMERCIAL ACQUISITIONS
(1980s)
DATE TITLE
January 1980 GAO: Implementation of Federal Policy
on ADCoP is Faltering Badly
1980-1982 Congressional Hearings: Small
Businesses express fear in regard to
commerciality requirements
March 1982 Executive Order 12352, "Federal
Procurement Reforms" signed by President
Reagan
July 1983 P.L. 98-63 (1983 Supplemental
Appropriations Act) written to contain
language protecting Small Business
interests IRT 1980-1982 hearings
September 1983 President's Private Sector Survey on
Cost Control (Grace Commission)
June 1986 President's Blue Ribbon Commission on
Defense Management (Packard Commission)
October 1986 P.L. 99-591 (1987 DoD Appropriations
Act) written to contain preference for
NDI
January 1987 DSB: Use of Commercial Components in
Military Equipment
February 1989 GAO: DoD Efforts Relating to NDI
July 1989 Defense Management Report (DMR)
November 1989 P.L. 101-189 (National Defense
Authorization Act for FYs 1990 and 1991)
mandated NDI training
SOURCE: Developed by researcher.
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On the surface, the 1990s appear to be not much different
than the preceding two decades. There has been quite a bit of
"action" thus far related to NDI and commercial products.
Their relationship to the defense industrial and technology
base, as well as the potential cost savings involved have been
topics of concern. P.L. 101-510, the 1991 DoD Authorization
Act, required DoD to conduct "market research" before
developing a new specification to ascertain the availability
of commercial products to meet the identified need [Ref 36:
pp. 3, 4]. Several publications have been released and a
training course initiated during the early 1990s to assist
acquisition personnel with the acquisition of NDI. Most
notably, the DoD 5000-series publications; SD-2, Buying NDI;
and SD-5, Market Analysis for NDI, provide direction for the
acquisition of NDI. The DoD 5000-series documents was an
attempt to consolidate the dozens of acquisition and
acquisition-related guidance documents into a more manageable
venue.
In somewhat of a departure from the past, the Streamlining
Defense Acquisition Law Advisory Panel, also known as the
Section 800 Panel, has provided detailed comments and
recommendations in regard to the amendment and repeal of a
number of acquisition statutes. Commissioned under Section 800
of P.L. 101-510, the Section 800 Panel reviewed over 600 DoD-
related procurement laws in line with its Congressional
charter [Ref 10:p. 6]. Chapter 8 of the Panel's report is
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devoted to the extensive reforms needed to enhance the
acquisition of commercial items, both as end items and as
components to DoD systems [Ref 10:p. 7]. In yet another
innovative move, a Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (DUSD)
for Acquisition Reform has been appointed to oversee the
reform effort.
In July 1993, the Report of the DSB Task Force on Defense
Acquisition Reform was issued. In his memo to the Secretary
of Defense, the Chairman of the DSB noted:
The primary thrust of the Task Force was the
identification of those measures which would reconnect and
integrate defense acquisition with the commercial
workplace from which it has been drifting apart at a
steady rate [Ref 7:p. 2].
Although not new, the DSB Task Force confirmed the need
for further action by providing the following two primary
recommendations in regard to priority issues identified:
0 Adopt commercial practices to the maximum extent
possible, while assuring the mixture of tools
available in the DoD and the commercial
marketplace to protect public trust.
0 A closer linking of the systems requirements
process to the operational plans and objectives of
the Unified Commands as well as the cost
constraints of the long-term budgetary process
[Ref 7:p. 1].
The efforts chronicled above serve as a testament to the
need for taking the next step--implementation. The Senate has
taken a step in this direction by introducing the Federal
Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1993. Title VIII of the
proposed legislation is titled "Commercial items" and
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addresses the Section 800 Panel recommendations. Table 3
presents the latest round of attempts to institutionalize the
acquisition of NDI.
TABLE 3
COMMISSIONS, REPORTS, STUDIES, ETC.
RELATED TO COMMERCIAL ACQUISITIONS
(1990s)
DATE TITLE
October 1990 SD-2, Buying NDI, released
November 1990 P.L. 101-510 (1991 DoD Authorization
Act) mandated market research for NDI
February 1991 DoD 5000-series publications released
July 1991 DoD-sponsored NDI training course
established
February 1992 SD-5, Market Analysis for NDI released
April 1992 NDI Advocates delegated by Deputy
Secretary of Defense
December 1992 Defense Conversion Commission:
Adjusting to the Drawdown
March 1993 Section 800 Panel Report: Streamlining
Defense Acquisition Laws
April 1993 First data call for measurement of NDI
June 1993 DUSD for Acquisition Reform appointed
July 1993 DSB: Defense Acquisition Reform
October 1993 Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of
1993 (S 1587) introduced on Senate floor




NDI is a generic term describing either a commercial
product or an item that has been previously developed. Its
current statutory definition, also found in DoD Instruction
5000.2, may be found in Appendix B. Additionally, for
purposes of measurement, DoD has expanded the definition of
NDI to include upgrades, integration, and minor modifications
of components and subsystems [Ref 35:p. 1-2]. Appendix C
contains DoD's expanded definition of NDI for measurement
purposes. Before proceeding however, a distinction is drawn
between terms which are often used interchangeably.
Commercial products and commercial off-the-shelf (COTS)
products are a subset of what DoD considers NDI. In other
words, these terms are not synonymous. Figure 2-1, below,
depicts the categories of NDI and provides examples of each
category. Commercial items consist of those items available
in the commercial marketplace. Examples include the Beretta
9 millimeter pistol, computers and electronic equipment, and
medical items. Other Service/Agency items consist of those
items already developed and in use by Local, State, or other
Federal Government Services/Agencies. Examples include the
Marine Corps' acquisition of the Army's Armored Combat
Earthmover (ACE) and the Navy's and Marine Corps' acquisition
of the Air Force's C-130 defensive electronic and infrared
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countermeasures suite. Foreign Military items consist of
those items already developed by foreign governments with
which the U.S. has a mutual defense cooperation agreement
(Ref 25]. An example is the purchase of the AV-8 Harrier
aircraft from the British Government.
Nondevelopmental Items
C-Commercial Other Service/Agency) Forei n Milita
"* Commodities • Avionics • Small Arms
"* Consumables • Aircraft • Missiles
"• Clothing • Engines • Ammunition
"* Software - Vehicles • Communications
FIGURE 2-1
SOURCE: DoD Manual 5000.37-M (DRAFT), Sep 1993, p. 1-4.
2. Application of Nondevelopmental Item Acquisition
NDI acquisition applies to the entire spectrum of
goods and services needed by DoD [Ref 35:p. 2-1]. The
increased use of NDI in major weapon systems acquisitions to
commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) acquisitions of basic
consumable items seeks to exploit the benefits of reduced
costs, proven quality, and timely fielding/acquisition. New
start acquisition programs offer a particularly fertile target
of opportunity. A full range of alternatives must be
considered prior to deciding to initiate a new acquisition
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program [Ref 31:p. 1-3]. Once non-materiel solutions, e.g.,
changes in policy, tactics, organization, etc., have been
considered and rejected, potential materiel solutions must be
considered. The hierarchy of potential materiel solutions, in
order of preference is:
1) Use or modification oi an existing U.S. military
system.
2) Use or modification of an existing commercially
developed or Allied system that fosters a nondevelopmental
item acquisition strategy.
3) A cooperative research and development program with one
or more Allied nations.
4) A new joint-Service development program.
5) A new Service-unique development program
(Ref 31:p. 1-3].
The objective of obtaining best value to the
Government is the primary underlying concern when faced with
the issues and challenges of any acquisition [Ref 51:p. 29].
The hierarchy of materiel solutions, noted above, places a
logical progression of preferences in the hands of acquisition
managers to make smart business decisions.
NDI acquisitions are managed within the overall system
acquisition process used for development programs [Ref 35:
p. 2-3]. With NDI, however, many of the steps, procedures,
requirements, and safeguards associated with the acquisition
may be unnecessary or even counterproductive. Assessment of
already established standard process elements, e.g., logistics
support analyses, test and performance data, reliability and
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maintainability assessments, etc. already available from the
contractor may be adequate to fulfill Government contract
requirements. Once a materiel solution has been selected, the
acquisition program may be tailored to meet the specific needs
of the program. Phases and milestone decision points may be
waived or deleted depending on environmental, modification,
and testing factors. Tailoring should reflect the environment
in which the item will be used, the extent of modification
necessary, and the amount of testing necessary to evaluate the
item to make sound program decisions [Ref 35:p. 2-1].
Examples of tailoring programs involving NDI follow.
a. An NDI meeting operational requirement with no
modification may allow a single decision review (milestone
I/III) to verify the item's suitability and to initiate
production.
b. An NDI requiring modification may entail an abbreviated
engineering development phase to verify suitability of
modifications prior to full scale development of the
modifications. Thus milestones I and II could be combined
with subsequent milestone III production decision upon
completion of the verification testing of the modification.
c. An NDI being integrated into an existing system may
also employ a combined milestone I/II decision when the
integration engineering required is considered to be low
risk [Ref 35:p. 2-1].
The application of NDI to an acquisition should be
viewed as a matter of degree rather than an all or nothing
proposition [Ref 35:p. 2-1]. NDI opportunities include the
integration or insertion of NDI piece parts, components, and
subsystems into higher level systems; NDI adaptation to meet
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environmental factors; and off-the-shelf or basic NDI
acquisition [Ref 1:p. 3]. Figure 2-2 shows the degree to










SOURCE: DoD Manual 5000.37-M (DRAFT), Sep 1993, p. 2-2.
D. BASIC CONCEPTS OF NDI
1. Introduction
The following sections discuss the basic concepts of
NDI. The most fundamental NDI concept is that it must meet
user's needs and function in the user's environment (Ref 35:
p. 2-2]. Further, NDI solutions must represent the best value
to DoD. Early identification of NDI alternatives and risk
management associated with cost, schedule, and performance
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trade-offs are required to increase the effectiveness of the
acquisition. Risk management involves:
Assessing program risks and risk management plans at each
milestone decision point (MDP) prior to granting approval
to the next acquisition phase .... Critical parameters that
are design cost drivers or have a significant impact on
readiness, capability, and life-cycle costs must be
identified early and managed intensively [Ref 31:p. 1-4].
Flexibility is another important factor to be
coordinated between the user and the developer. Early and
frequent communication between users and developers are
important to the assessment of requirements, risks, and
alternatives available and the acceptance of performance,
cost, and schedule trade-offs.
2. Life-Cycle Cost
Life-cycle cost considerations are no different in the
NDI acquisition as in development programs. Acquisition
strategies should be tailored to accomplish established
program objectives and to control risk [Ref 31:p. 1-4]. The
objective is to acquire the item with the lowest projected
life-cycle cost, within acceptable risks, while meeting
essential requirements.
3. Logistics Support
Logistics support of NDIs require careful, deliberate
upfront planning. NDI acquisitions are characteristically
faster-paced than development programs because of reduced R&D
requirements [Ref 51:p. 10]. This presents unique logistical
support challenges. An individualized integrated logistics
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support (ILS) plan, addressing the ten elements of ILS, i.e.,
1) maintenance planning; 2) manpower and personnel; 3) supply
support; 4) support equipment; 5) technical data; 6) training
and training support; 7) computer resources support; 8)
facilities; 9) packaging, handling, storage, and
transportation; and 10) design interface; is needed to assure
the probability of a successful outcome. Availability of spare
parts, adequate technical manuals, and a workable logistical
support plan require early, and often accelerated, planning to
meet requirements at initial operational capability (IOC).
Access to technical data rights is another significant
consideration to ensure potential "second sourcing" and
competitive reprocurement needs are met. Lastly, organic
versus contractor support plans should be addressed in the
acquisition strategy after weighing risks and benefits of the
NDI.
4. Configuration Control
The topic of configuration control within the Defense
Department is an evolving issue because of the current shift
in acquisition strategies to prefer NDIs/commercial products.
The Services and DoD components have considerably less control
over configuration of NDIs than developed items [Ref 35:
p. 2-4]. Commercial items, specifically the internal
configuration of commercial items, change with the market
[Ref 1:p. 44]. Therefore, projected life-cycle product
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availability and its components must be addressed in the
acquisition strategy. Likewise, technical data to support
attendant acquisitions may be required to ensure support of
the program.
5. Safety and Environment
Effective and efficient use of resources requires
safety-conscious decision-making. Of particular concern are
the safety issues when using material in a wide variety of
possible environmental scenarios. NDIs may present special
safety and environmental problems--when they are used in ways
other than for which they were designed (Ref 35:p. 2-4].
"Appropriate system safety and health hazard objectives shall
be addressed early in the program and used to guide system
safety and health hazard activities and the decision process"
[Ref 33:p. 6-I-I]. Acceptably safe systems are achieved
through a three step process which will be performed and
documented before purchase.
"* Prevent the initial creation of unnecessary hazards. This
is done by communicating to the developer that safety is
an important system attribute that must be designed in,
not added on. The design engineers must be sensitive to
this.
"* Establish a systein •afety program as described in this
section. This beco.es a more costly effort if the first
step is omitted.
"* Manage residual hazards. This is done by understanding
their nature and impact and ensuring their proper
disposition [Ref 33:p. 6-1-3].
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6. Market Analysis
Market analysis is a process that attempts to match
material alternatives to requirements. A tailored market
analysis is essential to analyze the full spectrum of
commercial products to meet DoD needs [Ref 36:p. 5]. This
tailoring is based on the anticipated dollar value of the
item, its complexity, and the number of items needed (Ref 36:
p. 9]. Market analysis consists of two steps: market
surveillance and market investigation. Market surveillance
consists of those activities that acquisition personnel
perform on an on-going basis, such as reviewing trade journals
and industry periodicals, attending industry symposia, etc. in
order to keep informed of the latest product and technological
developments. Market investigations may be required,
particularly in the case of complex items, when market
surveillance is found to be insufficient. The market
investigation consists of four parts:
1) identification of sources;
2) survey of manufacturers;
3) checking of references; and
4) evaluation [Ref 36:p. 10].
7. Training
The acquisition of NDI presents a potentially
challenging scenario to train users, operators, and all those
individuals involved in the acquisition process. This is
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particularly evident considering that DoD has identified
approximately 130,000 acquisition positions covered under the
Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) umbrella
(Ref 38:p. 167]. Training may also involve formal classroom
or on-the-job training in the care, deployment/employment,
maintenance, and operation of recently introduced or modified
products. Training with respect to markat analysis and the
NDI concept presents yet another challenge. The shift from a
development paradigm to one which embraces NDI is arguably the
greatest challenge to overcome in this area.
8. Data Rights
Data necessary to support essential requirements
throughout the item's life-cycle present significant
challenges to DoD. In many cases, commercial firms may not
grant access to "proprietary" information which could
jeopardize their competitive edge over similar firms. In any
case, a cost-benefit analysis of the cost to: 1) acquire the
data, 2) have access to the data, or 3) not have access to the
data, should be performed. Reprocurement and competitive
breakouts to procure spare parts must be assessed over the
potential life-cycle of the program.
9. Survivability Requirements
Survivability requirements encompassing a multitude of
potential scenarios play an increasingly more important role
in acquisition decision-making based on the current budgetary
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climate, reduction of new-start programs, and the continued
requirement for DoD to be a force in readiness.
Survivability requirements may be critical in evaluating NDI
[Ref 35:p. 2-5]. Survivability from all threats shall be
considered and include:
... conventional; electronic; initial nuclear weapon
effects; nuclear, biological, and chemical contamination
(NBCC); advanced threats such as high power microwave,
kinetic energy weapons, and directed energy weapons; and
terrorism or sabotage [Ref 33:p. 6-F-2].
Innovative life-cycle survivability techniques, such as
shielding or hardening may present options. Finally,
compatibility with personnel who must use the equipment in the
intended environment must also be considered.
10. Test and Evaluation Requirements
Test and evaluation requirements of NDIs present
similar, yet unique benefits and challenges when compared to
development programs. The goal of test and evaluation is to
reduce acquisition risks and assess the ability of the NDI to
meet requirements [Ref 35:p. 2-5]. Therefore, the importance
of early planning cannot be over emphasized as stated in the
following:
Test planning must begin in Phase 0, Concept Exploration
and Definition to ensure that the test program for the
most promising alternative can support the acquisition
strategy [Ref 33:pp. 8-2, 8-3].
Test and evaluation data previously available from the
contractor or user should be evaluated against the NDI and its
intended environment. This evaluation may identify an
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increasing level of risk of accepting previously completed
test and evaluation data as the NDI moves from an environment
for which it was intended to be used in to an environment
different from which it was intended. The Test and Evaluation
Master Plan (TEMP), should focus on the overall structure,
major elements, and objectives of the test program that is
consistent with the acquisition strategy [Ref 33: p. 8-3].
11. Support Equipment
Rarely is an NDI, or for that matter any product, a
product which stands alone. Calibration and test equipment,
technical and maintenance manuals, tools, and other associated
support equipment are normally required to ensure the support
and operational readiness of a product. Support equipment
must also be considered in the assessment of the life-cycle
costs of the NDI acquisition.
12. Specifying Requirements
Requirements specification marks the initial effort to
convert a mission need into a distinguishable material
requirement. The Federal Government requires descriptions of
agency requirements, whenever practical, to be stated in terms
of functions to be performed or performance required [Ref 52:
Part 10]. This statement takes its basis from 10 USC S2325,
the preference for NDI which may be found in Appendix B. A
similar approach which allows for design flexibility and
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encourages NDI alternatives entails the use of form, fit, and
function (F3 ) documentation, which is described as:
... descriptions that include factors such as size, weight,
performance, and test requirements of a component,
assembly or system specified to ensure interchangeability
but detailed construction and manufacturing processes are
left open to industry interpretation [Ref 18:pp. 36, 37].
E. BENEFITS AND CHALLENGES OF NDI ACQUISITIONS
NDI acquisitions provide potential benefits, as w&l as,
potential challenges for acquisition professionals. These
benefits and challenges form the framework for future cost-
benefit analyses.
1. Benefits
NDI acquisitions offer several major benefits:
"* Quick response to operational needs
"* Elimination or reduction of research and development (R&D)
costs
"* Reduction of item costs (lower life-cycle costs)
"* Application of state-of-the-art technology to current
requirements
"* Reduction in technical, cost, and schedule risks [Ref 35:
p. 1-5].
The main benefit offered by the acquisition of NDI is
reduced fielding time and the related cost savings due to the
reduced requirement for R&D. When considering NDI, thoughtful
consideration of 1) increased competition, 2) proven
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quality/proven capability, and 3) industrial base/dual-use
technology should also be exercised.
2. Challenges
Risks are inherent in most acquisition programs. The
NDI acquisition presents its own somewhat unique challenges
due to the accelerated acquisition cycle and also its
relatively new standing as the preferred acquisition
technique/method. Similar to potential benefits, caution
should be applied to the below listed challenges.
"* Selection and preparation of requirements documents
"* Plans for integrated logistics support (ILS) plans
"* Location (identification) and evaluation of potential
products
"* Continued product availability in the future
"* Escalation of product modifications
"* Fulfillment of performance requirements
Once the (above) benefits and challenges have been considered,
an analysis should take place. As is the case with most
acquisitions, cost-benefit analyses must be performed between
performance and cost parameters and trade-offs considered.
The NDI acquisition offers trade-offs between reduced risks
and development costs and those associated with performance.
Acquisition managers and support personnel are responsible for
ensuring that these analyses and trade-offs are conducted.
Additionally, Competition Advocate Generals were delegated as
NDI Advocates in this regard [Ref 4:p. 1].
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F. IMPEDIMENTS TO NDI ACQUISITIONS
Impediments to NDI acquisitions may be considered an
outgrowth or further extension of the challenges to NDI,
listed above. Impediments can be considered to fall into two
general categories--i) statutory and 2) non-statutory.
Several studies have been conducted since enactment of the
NDI preference. In 1989, studies were conducted by the
General Accounting Office (GAO) and the Senate Governmental
Affairs Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management.
Industry officials identified nine "claimed" impediments to
DoD's procurement of NDI in the GAO report as opposed to the
four broad areas identified in the latter report [Ref 51:
p. 13].
These nine claimed impediments consisted of:
"* management emphasis
"* notification and training of DoD acquisition personnel on
NDI
"* cost or pricing data
"* claimed problems related to FAR Part 11
"* Government rights to technical data
"* use of varying contract provisions
"* use of military specifications
"* modification of items to meet NDI needs
"* multiple award schedule [Ref 51:pp. 13-44].
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G. UNDERLYING THEORETICAL IMPORTANCE
A successful NDI acquisition demands a philosophical shift
in requirements planning and material development [Ref 35:
p. vi].
The force behind this shift was the tremendous "cost of
developing products to meet detailed or unique Government
specifications and of duplicating existing commercial
d'stribution systems...." Unfortunately, this is an issue
wt (DoD) continue to struggle with today, 20 years later!
[Ref l:p. 4].
It has been generally recognized that DoD can no longer
afford to conduct "business as usual." NDI is a category of
materiel acquisition strategies that has a mandated preference
[Ref 54:p. 15]. In his 1992 Annual Report to the President
and the Congress, then-Secretary of Defense, Dick Cheney
stated:
... because the Department has become so accustomed to
development and design, special emphasis is needed to
encourage examination of commercial and NDI alternatives
[Ref 38:p. 39].
The following statement further captures the reason to not
only prefer NDIs but to actively pursue, acquire, and use
them.
Further, the reason for such emphasis (now even statutory)
on buying NDIs rather than developing new items is
obvious: NDIs are usually cheaper and available
sooner.. .experience with NDIs (also) shows that, when they
are properly bought to meet a DoD need, their quality
tends to be as good as if not better than that of
specially developed items [Ref 36:p. 5].
NDI acquisition therefore represents the preferred materiel
solution to meet DoD's requirements. Maximum practicable use
of NDIs offers opportunities to meet the challenges ahead of
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meeting DoD's requirements in the downward spiral of Defense
funding.
H. SUNMARY
This chapter provided a review of the nondevelopmental
item acquisition concept. The objective was to provide a
framework for determining alternative solutions to DoD's
sluggish implementation of the NDI acquisition initiatives.
Chapter III will present data collected during the research
and a compendium of interview responses.
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III. A COMPENDIUM OF INTERVIEW RESPONSES
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter consists of a compilation of data collected
and a compendium of 20 interview responses to a questionnaire
developed for this study. By and large, personal interviews
were conducted on-site in the interviewee's office to allow
for clarity of each response, as well as allowing for
elaboration and follow-up questions in the same regard.
Telephone interviews were conducted where personal interviews
were not possible. Interview questions were based on the
literature review and corresponding issues from it which face
the DoD or specific Service. The goal was to elicit responses
that would allow for further discussion, as well as provide a
basis for consistent interpretation across all interviews.
The questions represent a sampling of issues previously
identified as primary and subsidiary research questions and
involve issues correlating to the NDI program framework of
each interviewee's organization. Responses were provided with
the understanding that they were on a non-attribution basis.
A list of those individuals interviewed is contained in
Appendix D. Those interviewed represent top-level proponents
of the DoD and Service NDI programs, as well as high-level
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industry representatives. Table 4 delineates the mix of
offices from which interviewees were represented.
TABLE 4
A SUM?4ARY OF RESPONDENTS INTERVIEWED
Activity Respondents (Number)
OASD (Economic Security) 3
OFPP I
US Army NDI Advocate Ofc 2
US Navy NDI Advocate Ofc * 2
US Air Force NDI Adv Ofc 1
USMC NDI Advocate Ofc I
Marine Corps Systems Cmd * 4
SASC Staff Member I
The Boeing Company 1
Aerospace Industry Assoc. 1
DUSD (Acquisition Reform) 1
DSMC 2
TOTAL - 20
* Includes a member of the 1992-93 DoN NDI Working Group
SOURCE: Developed by the researcher.
B. INFORMATIONAL DATA
1. NDI Measurement Results
Table 5 represents DoD's baseline of commercial and
other NDI used to meet its procurement needs.
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TABLE 5
INITIAL QUANTITATIVE NDI DATA
(FY 1992)
= 1 -i - i
SVC ACAT C (M$) C (%) 0 (M$) 0 (%) T (M$) T (%)
USA I 192 3.6 136 2.6 328 6.2
II 37 9.0 107 26.4 144 35.4
III 289 18.2 489 30.7 777 48.9
USN I 204 1.6 945 7.2 1,149 8.8
II 91 6.0 243 15.8 335 21.8
III 33 2.8 53 4.4 86 7.2
USAF I 1,484 17.5 82 1.0 1,566 18.5
II 33 7.4 48 10.6 81 18.0
III 57 13.9 58 14.0 115 27.9
DOD I 1,880 7.0 1,163 4.3 3,043 11.3
II 161 6.7 398 16.6 560 23.3
III 379 11.9 600 18.8 978 30.7
Source: OASD (Economic Security) Production Resources/MM
LEGEND:
C: Comme.Lcial 0: Other NDI T: Total NDI
USA: US Army USN: US Navy USAF: US Air Force
M: Millions ACAT: Acquisition Category
DOD: Department of Defense
Other: * US Marine Corps combined under USN
* Data include major components of first-tier subsystems
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The USD (A&T) is required to submit a report to the Deputy
Secretary of Defense annually for the next five years on the
progress made in procuring commercial and other NDI [Ref 4:p.
2]. The information contained in Table 5 was collected by
OASD (Economic Security) Production Resources/Manufacturing
Modernization (MM) via a database application provided to each
of the Military Departments. As such, it represents a
somewhat "manual" data call since Fiscal Year (FY) 1992 NDI
data had not been collected as they occurred. Additionally,
subjective assessment of the degree to which a program was
"classified" can be seen in the following excerpt taken from
the initial data call cover letter.
This first report was based on Fiscal Year (FY) 1992
dollars and included acquisition categories (ACAT) I, II,
and III. Classification of a system as "commercial" or
"other NDI" involved consideration down to major
components of first tier subsystems. Determination of the
percentage of a system being"commercial" or "other NDI"
was vested in the Program Executive Officer (PEO), Program
Manager (PM), Army Major Subordinate Command, Navy Major
Systems Command, or Air Force Major Command assigned
responsibility for the system. This authority was
delegatable to whatever organizational level deemed
necessary to accomplish the undertaking [Ref 6:p. 1].
Expanded definitions of both commercial and other NDI were
used for the data collection process. As previously
discussed, the main thrust of these expanded definitions
evolved around modifications, upgrades, and integration of
components and subsystems. Appendix C contains the DoD
expanded NDI definition for measurement purposes.
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2. Training
P.L. 101-189, the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991, directed the Secretary of
Defense to establish a program for training appropriate
acquisition personnel in the acquisition of NDI. This
training was required to include instruction on:
1) pertinent regulations and statutory references;
2) fundamental principles of price analysis and other
alternative means of determining price reasonableness; and
3) market research techniques and drafting of functional
and performance specifications.
In July 1991, a two-day workshop in the fundamentals of NDI
was established. The course curriculum consists of an
overview of NDI--its historical and legislative background,
associated concepts, and the benefits and challenges of using
NDIs; practical application exercises using case studies; and
several quality video segments involving the paradigm shift
phenomenon. The course is presented via contractual
arrangement with a civilian firm. To maximize participation,
the courses are funded by the Defense Acquisition University
(DAU) and conducted on-site around the United States. The
course is designed to accommodate 25 students per session and
50 sessions per year. Thus far participation has averaged
approximately 21 students per session; however, an average of
only 25 sessions have been conducted annually. Table 6
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* Does not include DLA (seven courses/167 students in FY 1
SOURCE: OASD (Economic Security) Production Resources
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C. INTERVIEW RESULTS
This section discusses the nine questions used during
interviews with the 20 interviewees noted in Appendix D.
These nine questions were formulated with the intent of
surfacing issues related to the source of DoD's inability to
fully implement the statutory NDI initiatives. The underl: ing
objective of all nine questions was to solicit responses that
might come to help improve DoD's implementation of the NDI
initiatives
1. Definition
The objective of this question was to validate
previously established positions in regard to the clarity of
the definition of NDI. Previously published articles and
other material on NDI seemed to indicate inconsistencies in
defining NDI.
Question#1: How would you define an NDI acquisition?
a. Discussion
The definition of NDI caused very little
controversy for the respondents. The preponderance of
interviewees concurred with the existing statutory definition
contained in Appendix B. An opposing view held by two of the
respondents separated "already developed" products from
"commercial" products as two separate entities. This is as
opposed to the current understanding that commercial products
are a subset of what DoD considers NDI. The reason given for
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the separation of these terms dealt with the preference
hierarchy of NDI alternatives. The two respondents referred
to above stated that commercial products should head the list,
in line with the Administration's commercial-military
technology integration policy.
The definition of commercial product, commercial
item, commercial off-the-shelf item, and commercial-type
product were not nearly as well understood as the definition
of NDI. Many respondents referred to definitions in the
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), Defense Federal
Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS), and DoD Instruction
5000.2. However, respondents felt that there was a lack of
clear understanding among the terms. Several respondents felt
that there was not a need for all of these terms.
Similarly, the meaning of minor modification was
less clear in the minds of the respondents. "Minor
modification" is defined as a modification to a commercial
item that does not alter the commercial item's function or
essential physical characteristics [Ref 30:Part 211.7001 (d)].
Respondents referred to this definition and its failure to




The following sample responses are representative
of the responses provided by interviewees in regard to this
question:
The definition of NDI may be found in 10 USC S2325 and DoD
Instruction 5000.2, Part 6, Section L. Additionally, DoD
has come out with an expanded definition of NDI for
measurement purposes. This expanded cefinition was
provided in DoD's tasker for measuring the progress in
acquisition of NDI. It involves integration of NDI at the
subsystem and component level and minor modifications to
achieve successful integration.
NDI includes commercial items and already developed items
by other domestic Government, and in some cases, foreign
government agencies.
In contrast to the norm, which pointed to the statutory
definition, the following response is representative of two
interviewees that broke out commercial products separately
from NDI:
There is a proposal where commercial items will no longer
be a subset of what DoD considers NDI. This set of
definitions would be more in line with the current
Administration's preference for commercial products. The
definition would set up the distinction such that
commercial products would take preference over already
developed products.
2. Extent of Implementation
This question was formulated to get to the "heart" of
the research purpose. Based on the position of those
interviewed in this regard, the assumption was that these
interviewees were in the best position to objectively assess
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the degree to which individual Services were complying with
the NDI initiatives.
Question #2: To what extent has DoD/your Service implemented
the NDI initiatives set forth in 10 USC S2325?
a. Discussion
Initially, all but one respondent agreed that a
quantitative answer to this question was not possible. One
reason given for this was that measurement data and statistics
had not yet been collected. In the minds of those respondents
there was a clear link between measurement data and the
question. Likewise, several respondents were apprehensive
about the validity of such data, once collected, because of
the subjective nature of its intended collection methodology.
One Service already had an automated means of tracking NDI
data. There was a consensus that laws such as the Truth in
Negotiations Act (TINA) prohibited full implementation of the
initiatives, as well. The primary reason provided by
respondents in this regard was the incompatability of many
industry firm's accounting systems with the requirement to
provide the Government with cost or pricing data. Therefore,
respondents rallied around the point that legislative action
was required to fulfill greater usage of NDI. Additionally,
all respondents acknowledged that improvements in the
acquisition of NDI were possible.
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Nine respondents felt that the requirement to
conduct market research/analysis had not been adequately
undertaken. Training in market research techniques, time
available to conduct market analysis, and management emphasis
were reasons provided for this shortcoming. Six respondents
identified the Government's culture as a primary reason for
DoD's failure to fully irrplement the initiatives.
Specifically, DoD's propensity to prefer development efforts
and for using military-unique specifications and standards
were cited as primary limiting factors in DoD's
implementation of the NDI acquisition initiatives. Three
interviewees noted that the extent of implementation varies by
the type of commodity procured.
b. Sample Responses
The following sample responses are representative
of interview replies to the research question:
We have always been in compliance with 10 USC S2325;
however, our emphasis on its implementation has been
redoubled.
In contrast to the above positive-natured response, the
following responses generally reflect a more pessimistic
outlook on implementation of NDI acquisition initiatives:
Lip service is paid to NDI.
It varies by commodity area. In total, NDI usage has been
tough to measure. DoD has just initiated a somewhat
quantifiable measurement system and the results are not in
yet.
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DoD has a long way to go. There are still many
inconsistencies with existing laws and Governmental
practices. Examples of these inconsistencies include the
Government's use of inappropriate clauses and military
specifications, inappropriate requests for certified cost
or pricing data, and excessive Governmental requirements.
DoD "talks the talk" but does not "walk the walk."
Generally, there has been more acceptance to using
commercial products but it varies by commodity area and
product.
Trying to quantify "modification" is not clearly
addressed. It is clearly a subjective measure.
3. Recommendations for Improvement
The primary purpose of asking this question was to
elicit responses that presented recommendations that were
either new and innovative ways of looking at the issue or
previously identified recommendations that may now be
appropriate given the evolving nature of NDI acquisition
issues. The overarching goal was to solicit recommendations
that could enhance DoD's efforts to implement the NDI
initiatives.
Question #3: What recommendations do you have for DoD/your
Service in attempting to implement NDI acquisition
initiatives?
a. Discussion
The majority of respondents believed that, besides
the actions pending on legislation directed toward
implementing the Section 800 Panel Report recommendations,
other actions were required to implement the NDI initiatives.
45
There were no quick-fix, easy solutions offered by those
interviewed. Training and the underlying goal of shifting the
acquisition process paradigm permeated the responses. All
responses referred to training either directly or indirectly.
Six responses referred to a need to shift toward more
commercial practices and performance based specifications. In
each case, the respondents referred to educating personnel in
these disciplines, as well as more definitive action such as
specification reviews and challenging restrictive
specifications. It was generally understood that this (and
all recommendations) would require unswerving leadership,
focus on the "big picture," sacrifices, and above all--time
and patience. Dr. William Perry, Deputy Secretary of Defense,
addressed this very issue with the DUSD for Acquisition
Reform, the DoD Standardization Executives, and NDI Advocates.
Before the first meeting of a process action team (PAT) tasked
with developing a plan of action to ensure that military
documents are not used in an acquisition unless they are the
only practical way to ensure that DoD needs are met, Dr. Perry
stated that:
... our goal in shifting away from military specifications
and standards is not a numbers game to see how many
documents we can convert to commercial item descriptions
(CIDs) or nongovernment standards, but rather to determine
how DoD can change its way of doing business...(Dr. Perry
also tasked the Standardization Executives and NDI
Advocates) to provide real leadership required for this
cultural change, provide concrete guidance to the field on
how to change and what to change in order to implement the
cultural change, and to push the leadership to modify
policies to facilitate the change [Ref 40:p. 13].
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b. Sample Responses
The following sample responses are a representative
specimen of replies to the research question:
The Section 800 Panel recommendations are clearly a good
start to help DoD implement the NDI initiatives.
Basic training in awareness of NDI opportunities is
required. The target audience should be those individuals
involved in requirements generation, contracts, and
logistics at a minimum. A "meeting of the minds" is
needed to as.re optimal use of NDIs.
More training on the requirements generation process is
required. That is where NDI solutions are born or
aborted. Specifically, we need to do a better (more
realistic/factual) job of performance trade-off and
determinations. Goes hand-in-glove with the need to do
better market investigations and general surveillance.
Also, I would recommend that we manage risk rather than
avoid it.
Training! Training! Training! In particular DoD needs
to require cross functional training.
Training is the most important thing we can do for our
people. We need to increase our training for those
generating the requirements to ensure performance based
specifications are used to the maximum extent practicable.
On a more comprehensive note, one Service representative
outlined a more detailed approach:
Change the current limiting paradigm to the more flexible-
tailorable acquisition process spectrum defined and
authorized in DcD Instruction 5000.2. This will require:
1) The USD (A&T) to issue a policy guidance memorandum on
the DoD Instruction 5000.2 authorized acquisition process
spectrum.
2) Development of an executive brief on the acquisition
process spectrum to be used to educate the acquisition
chain-of-command.
3) Revise mandatory acquisition training to address the
new acquisition process spectrum paradigm.
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4) Develop a brochure describing the acquisition process
spectrum paradigm to be signed out by the USD (A&T) and
distributed to all leveia and all members of the
acquisition workforce.
Industry representatives made the following comments in
response to this question:
We must move toward industry standards and performance-
based specifications.
DoD mvst take the existing acquisition system and use more
comme cial practices.
Reverse the psychology where NDI is the norm. This will
involve a top-down approach. With the recent change in
leadership (Administration) and their commercial-military
integration focus, the time is right.
4. Key Impediments
The objective of this question was to evoke real-time
impediments facing the Defense Department. The underlying
objective was to validate previously published impediments and
to solicit any newly identified barriers to NDI acquisitions.
Question #4: What are the key impediments facing DoD/your
Service in implementing the 10 USC S2325 NDI acquisition
initiatives?
a. Discussion
Not surprisingly, all interviewees identified
legislative barriers to the acquisition of NDI. The primary
example cited in this regard was the TINA requirement for cost
or pricing data. Most respondents felt that the
recommendations made by the Section 800 Panel to amend or
repeal existing laws would significantly increase the
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acquisition of NDI. The main reason cited was that industry
would be more willing to enter into business arrangements more
in line with generally accepted commercial business practices.
Two respondents felt that additional legislative measures were
needed to ensure the viability of the preference for NDI to
truly take seed and grow. The focus of this argument centered
on the perceived adversarial relationship between DoD and
industry. These same two respondents noted that DoD practices
and industry (commercial) practices were incongruent. This
failure to "see eye-to-eye" impeded the DoD's ability to
attract some potential commercial product alternatives in
their opinion. Eight respondents identified the
culture/cultural mindsets as the primary impediment to
implementing the NDI acquisition initiatives. The underlying
challenge is the knowledge that change of any kind is often
resisted. Specification issues were entwined with the culture
issue to a large degree. Six respondents felt that over
specification of DoD needs lead to less than optimal use of
NDI alternatives. One interviewee noted that there are
approximately 35,000 military specifications and standards on
the books today [Ref 38:p. 39]. The challenge to review them
was viewed as a monumental task. Two respondents identified
advance planning and the time required to do so as a key
impediment. Particularly for ILS issues, advance and often




The following responses are a compilation of
interview responses that form a relative sampling of replies
received.
Chapter 8 of the Section 800 Panel Report says it best.
Briefly, the procurement process (how DoD buys) is a major
impediment.
The plethora of military-unique specifications and
standards and our inability to let them go is a major
impediment.
Clauses and their flowdown provisions, as well as the TINA
requirements for certified cost or pricing data represent
the biggest challenges for DoD to overcome in the
commercial products arena.
The narrow interpretation of TINA exemptions must be
overcome. Contracting Officers should not require
certified cost or pricing data just to "cover" themselves.
Additional cost savings and a more non-adversarial
business relationship are natural byproducts.
There are a number of impediments that limit DoD's ability
to procure NDI. The improper use of military
specifications and standards, the TINA requirement for
cost or pricing data, and the cultural mindsets of the DoD
acquisition workforce seem to be the most prevalent.
Industry's aversion to doing business with DoD because of
excessive requirements such as separate accounting
systems, inappropriate requests for cost or pricing data,
etc.
Streamlining requires a lot more up front work to describe
requirements precisely and concisely.
Knowledge of what is out there.
5. Service Attempts to Overcome Impediments
The goal of this question was to elicit responses that
provided methodologies to help overcome the barriers to
acquiring NDIs. The underlying purpose was to identify
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workable solutions that might prove to be beneficial to other
Services.
Question #5: How is DoD/your Service attempting to overcome
these impediments in order to comply with Congressional intent
of the USC?
a. Discussion
Responses ranged from proactive, detailed,
integrated plans to more reactive "wait and see" attitudes.
Training was a common approach expressed by all of those
interviewed. However, because of the limited availability of
opportunities to be trained at the DoD-sponsored course,
respondents expressed a desire for additional opportunities to
acquire training for their personnel. Five respondents noted
that regulations were being updated and in three cases, new
material was being developed. This new material was aimed at
disseminating information and making the NDI acquisition more
"user friendly." Two respondents noted increased emphasis on
market analyses of requirements to identify commercial or
other NDI alternatives. Four respondents identified increased
review and challenges of military specifications and standards
as a means to overcome barriers to NDI acquisitions. Two
interviewees responded that a network of NDI Advocates were in
place to provide upper-level attention to NDI. One respondent
noted the on-going efforts to cancel inappropriate
specifications and convert military specifications and
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standards to CIDs, where possible. The respondent identified
a Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) report
entitled: Road Map for MilSpec Reform--Integrating Commercial
and Military Manufacturing. The report highlighted DoD's
systemic roadblocks to using commercial products and processes
and provided several recommendations to help overcome them
[Ref 40:p.8].
b. Sample Responses
The following sample responses represent a
representative continuum of the degree to which Services have
attempted to overcome impediments to NDI acquisitions. The
first response is taken from a Service representative's plan
forwarded to DoD in response to DoD's request for initial
measurement progress of NDI.
Our Service has outlined our efforts in our response to
DoD's tasker on the progress *.n measuring commercial and
other NDI. First, we are actively pursuing the hard
cultural changes that will significantly enhance our usage
of commercial and other NDI strategies. Second, we have
established a network of Associate NDI Advocates, bringing
local executive level NDI emphasis to acquisition sites.
Third, our Acquisition Improvement Seminars, more commonly
known as the "Road Shows," is one of our hallmark
initiatives. Fourth, an important adjunct to the Road
Shows has been our concentrated, executive reviews of
Requests for Proposal (RFP), better known as "RFP scrubs."
Fifth, related to the RFP scrubs, we have recently
instituted a comprehensive multi-disciplinary team review
of selected acquisition strategies specifically focused on
eliminating low value-added functional requirements.
Sixth, development of a guidebook to assist field
personnel in preparing performance based specifications is
underway. Seventh, we have increased (two-way)
communication with industry, which is an important
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underpinning to enhance access to the commercial
marketplace, its products, and manufacturing "know how.0
Eighth, we have conducted a study in association with the
Department of Commerce, of DoD accounting practices that
were identified by industry as major deterrents to doing
business with DoD. Finally, we continue to emphasize
communication with foreign governments via data exchange
agreements, technology assessment visits...
Training at both of the DoD-sponsored NDI training
courses--the two-day NDI Acquisition Workshop and the
tailored Executive Seminar is one method of bridging the
gap.
Focusing on other than training issues, other DoD Service
representatives identified the following steps to help
overcome barriers to the acquisition of NDIs:
Specification review groups have been set up and are an
on-going effort within DoD. The other part of the
equation involves the field and their part in identifying
and challenging inappropriate specifications. In too many
cases, outdated or cancelled specifications are referenced
in contracts.
Market analysis plays a large part in our efforts to
maximize the use of NDIs. It appears to be one of the
keys to unlock the NDI door.
One command has set up a data base for communication-
electronic equipment that will be continually updated.
Industry representatives had the following to say about the
DoD's overcoming of barriers to NDI acquisitions:
It is easy to say, "buy commercial," but quite a number of
things need to change. Legislation and training are (or
should be) the cornerstones of this issue.
The Section 800 Panel recommendations and the introduction
of th, 1993 Acquisition Streamlining Act in the Senate
certainly will help alleviate many of the impediments that
have plagued NDI over the years. The question now is--how
much and how soon?
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6. Implications of Military Service Differences
The primary purpose of this question was to identify
any unique circumstances that might inhibit a Service from
complying with the Congressionally-mandated NDI acquisition
initiatives. The underlying goal was to validate the across-
the-board similar treatment of all Services in regard to NDI
acquisitions.
Question #6: To what extent are there specific differences
between Services that have prevented/allowed for the more
timely implementation of the Title 10 NDI acquisition
initiatives? What are they? (How) can they be overcome?
a. Discussion
Responses primarily identified subtle differences
among the Services. While many of the Services share common
functions, all have somewhat unique roles that help explain
one reason for these subtleties. One reason related to common
functions involves the military hardware acquired by the
respective Services. In order to perform these common (often
secondary) functions, similar material is required. In the
recent review of the Missions, Roles, and Functions of the
Armed Forces of the United States by the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, many of these overlapping functions were
validated by way of association with the currently embraced
joint doctrine [Ref 29:p. 11-18]. Typically, the material
associated with these overlapping functions represents a
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"pocket of success." Examples include jet engines, safety and
survivability equipment, and medical supplies and equipment.
Some specific differences involve unique environmental
requirements such as diesel vice gas-powered generating
equipment for shipboard use and safety. Another common
response was the potential differences associated with support
plans.
b. Sample Responses
The following sample responses are a representative
compilation of replies received from interviewees:
There are subtleties that separate the Services. Benign
and potentially hostile environments exist for all of DoD.
Some would argue that one Service or another performs in
a more harsh environment, i.e., potentially hotter,
colder, drier, wetter; forward deployed versus "in the
rear"; fluid versus static...but it comes down to the
different weaponry and materiel that a particular Service
procures.
One argument is concerned with support strategies.
Commercial versus organic support should be a major
consideration when planning an acquisition. In the case
of the Services, maintenance and support strategies must
consider where the product will be supported from. If
forward deployed in the field, organic support seems to
make the most sense. Another important consideration is
the economics of the decision.
Pockets of success have suggested that there are no real
boundaries as far as the Services go. Service
requirements that more closely fit commercial capabilities
have provided the most success. Examples include safety
and fire-fighting equipment, computers and electronics
equipment, medical supplies, clothing and textile




The primary purpose of this question was to identify
present and expected future DoD and Service guidance on NDI
and any shortfalls in this area. The underlying goal was to
identify potential notions on improving the awareness of NDI
via this medium, as well as to enhance NDI guidance (short of
supp.lementation).
Question #7: What specific DoD/Service guidance, i.e.,
directives, instructions, pamphlets, etc., has been issued?
Planned?
a. Discussion
In general, there was not a great deal of concern
about additional Service guidance in this area because of the
stipulation within the DoD 5000-series that supplementation of
guidance was not authorized. However, many respondents felt
that some type of implementing document was required which
would address any unique issues and relationships. An example
is the network of Associate NDI Advocates in some Services,
their roles, reporting relationships and requirements, etc.
In one case a respondent felt that a simple pamphlet on the
NDI acquisition process should be developed and distributed to
the entire acquisition workforce.
b. Sample Responses
The following responses include a sampling of
headquarters-issued guidance on NDI. Caveat: the below list
56
I .... . ... ........ .... 
does not represent an all-inclusive listing, realizing that in
many cases subordinate command's, e.g., Systems Commands, have
issued their own guidance based on individual organizational




SD-5, Market Analysis for Nondevelopmental Items
DoD Directive 5000.1, Defense Acquisition
DoD Instruction 5000.2, Defense Acquisition Management
Policies and Procedures
DoD Manual 5000.2-M, Defense Acquisition Management
Documentation and Reports
Planned:
DoD Manual 5000.37-M, Commercial and Other









Air Force Instruction 63-401, Competition Advocacy
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Navy: Issued:
SecNavInst 5000.2A, Implementation of Defense Acquisition
Management Policies, Procedures, Documentation, and
Reports
SecNavInst 5200.32A, Acquisition Management Policies and




Marine Corps Order P5000.10C, Systems Acquisition
Management Manual
Planned:
Marine Corps Order P5000.XX, Implementation of Defense
Acquisition Management Policies, Procedures,
Documentation, and Reports
8. Extent of Training
The primary objective of this question was to identify
the degree to which the DoD acquisition workforce had received
training on the concepts associated with NDI acquisitions.
The underlying objective was to identify NDI training
opportunities, training shortcomings, and to validate the NDI
training requirement.
Question #8: To what extent have DoD/Service acquisition




All respondents were aware of the DoD-sponsored
two-day NDI workshop, encouraged acquisition workforce
attendance, and noted the void to reach the entire target
audience. The target audience consists of the acquisition
workforce, which for DAWIA purposes is estimated at 130,000
personnel [Ref 38:p. 167]. Additionally, one respondent felt
as though the NDI course would become a DAWIA requirement in
the near future. In three cases, respondents identified
internal Service-related efforts to enhance the ability to
reach more of the target audience in a more timely manner. In
this regard, five respondents felt that improvements were
required in Defense Acquisition University (DAU)-sponsored
acquisition courses. This included increased NDI coverage in
already developed courses and the need for a separate NDI
course within the DAU curriculum. All respondents noted that
there was no market research training course available within
DoD.
b. Sample Responses
The following responses provide a representative
sampling of interview replies:
The DoD offers a two-day on-site NDI Workshop. The course
has been offered approximately 30 times a year and is
capable of training 25 people per class session.
Service representatives made the following comments in regard
to NDI training:
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In FY 93 we have 10 of the 28 OSD offerings. In FY 94 we
are trying to set up six to eight of the 18-20 total
offerings. We are also assisting DSMC to build in NDI
blocks into their larger offerings.
We are limited to the DoD-sponsored course. We have no
Service-sponsored courses on NDI.
Besides the NDI course, we have trained over 1500 of our
middle managers and acquisition managers in an Acquisition
Streamlining course since FY 87.
Quotas to some program management courses are hard to come
by. We have Service-sponsored short courses in Project
Officer Systems Acquisition Training, which are generally
not well received. Additionally, we have a local
familiarization/introductory course on the recent changes
caused by the new DoD 5000-series. We are trying to shift
the paradigm via our training program.
A DoD official commented on the importance of the NDI training
course by stating:
In all likelihood, the DoD NDI course will become a DAWIA
requirement. With the immenseness of the target audience,
this is the only way to ensure the acquisition workforce
"gets the word."
An industry official summed up the task ahead of DoD by
stating that:
Training the acquisition workforce is a daunting
challenge.
9. Statistical Data
The primary purpose of this question was to estabJlzh
if a measurement proce.ss had been established and instituted
within the DoD for NDI acquisitions. A secondary purpose of
this question was to identify the collection methodology used
and the perceived utility of the data with the goal of
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attempting to identify shortcomings which might be corrected
to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the process.
Question #9: Does DOD/your Service compile statistical data
on NDI acquisitions?
a. Discussion
During initial interviews most respondents
unequivocally responded, no. DoD was in the process of
responding to the Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum of 24
April 1992 requirement to report the progress in the
acquisition of commercial and other NDI for five years.
Shortly before this writing, the final data were reported to
DoD. Table 5 presented these data. This initial report forms
the baseline upon which future trends and decisions will be
based. Interviews following the initial report revealed that
the results generally mirrored expectations. In two cases,
respondents were mildly surprised at results in a particular
ACAT--one positively (thought results would be lower) and one
negatively (thought results would be higher). Most
respondents felt that the data had inherent inaccuracies
built-in due to the subjective natute of the collection
methodology.
b. Sample Responses
The following sample responses are a compilation of
interview replies:
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At this time (June 1993) we do not collect measurement
data on NDI; however, the requirement has just been levied
on us and we are scrambling to respond to DoD.
In contrast, one Service respondent stated:
We have a measurement system, the Acquisition Milestone
Management System (AAMS), that helps us identify what is
and is not NDI--on a binary basis. Other than that it is
not that useful. The OASD requires that we establish a
baseline of NDI usage.
In regard to the utility of the data, respondents stated:
To be meaningful.. .we should wait and see what next year's
data show us. We should proceed slowly and not be so
quick to assign any percentage goals or the like, similar
to competition requirements, until we assess what the data
tells us. Additionally, we should be looking at what it
(will) cost us to collect the data.
The quality of the data within the report is suspect. The
subjective nature of assignment criteria allows a lot of
room for i.nterpretation.
In contrast, a DoD official stated that:
Although there was a lot of judgmental decision-making
involved, I have a high degree of confidence in the
statistical report. Granted, if a different cast of
characters were to do the same thing we would probably
have slight variances. Without the benefit of parts being
coded, i.e., commercial, already developed (other NDI), or
other, a degree of subjectivity is to be expected. It is
a matter of a cost-benefit trade-off and the expense of
coding parts/part numbers is prohibitive at this time.
D. SUMMARY
Chapter III presented the first-ever measurement data of
commercial and other NDI, the results of training efforts
since FY 1991, as well as, a representative compilation of
interview responses. Many responses echoed the same themes
that have been surfaced over the past two decades. However,
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"real" progress was a common thought expressed by respondents
because of hard evidence in this regard--the Section 800 Panel
Report recommendations and the recently compiled DoD NDI
measurement results. No simple, clear-cut ideas emerged which
would transform the current situation. A late breaking event
however shows great promise. The Senate's introduction of the
Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1993 (S 1587) clearly
signifies Congress' resolve in this matter. The proposed Act
is the next step to initiate the Section 800 Panel
recommendations into law. Chapter IV will identify and
analyze the major issues and concerns that have surfaced
because of this research effort.
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IV. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF CRITICAL ISSUES
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter consists of a comparative analysis of the
critical issues and problems identified as a result of
interviews and research conducted. The following discusLion
involves an interpretation of responses to the research
questions, researcher views of responses, and researcher
synthesis of the foregoing with information gathered during
the literature review. In doing so, the goal of this chapter
is to scrutinize the data presented in the preceding chapters.
Three significant issues have been identified for analysis.
First, legislative barriers to the acquisition of NDI will be
discussed. A two-part focus will be used. The first portion
of the discussion will focus on specific legislative issues
which limit NDI acquisitions. The second portion will focus
on evolving initiatives to overcome legislative barriers which
limit the acquisition of NDIs. Second, measurement processes
and results will be evaluated. The underlying concerns are
the reactive nature of the process, the subjectivity involved
with the identification of NDI, and the unclear interpretation
and utility of the data. The final issue involves the
acquisition process paradigm and the need to shift to the
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paradigm embracing the preference to procure commercial
products (NDI) and use commercial practices.
B. LEGISLATIVE BARRIERS
A number of legislative barriers to NDI acquisitions are
currently being addressed by the Congress in the Senate's
proposed Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1993 (S
1587). Industry is playing an active role in providing
recommendations to (and corresponding rationale) conform more
to industry standards.
1. Legislative Issues
Legislative barriers to the acquisition of NDI have a
long and documented history. Legislation such as the Buy
America Act, TINA, and socioeconomic statutes provide for
protection against a myriad of factors and protection of large
voting constituencies. In defense of the actions taken by
Congress in this respect, many of the barriers are a result of
Congress' concern to protect the interests of the American
public. The history of commercial product acquisition efforts
is one of good intentions that have failed to bear fruit
because none of the efforts to date have created a complete,
systematic statutory and regulatory structure for buying
commercial producLs [Ref 39 :p. 8-10]. As previously depicted
in Tables 1 through 3, found in Chapter II, numerous efforts
have taken place over the years to study legislative issues
facing NDI. In 1988, then-Congressman Les Aspin was quoted as
65
saying that perhaps the next executive commission on
acquisition should be created, not to propose the reforms, but
to implement them.
2. Current Legislative Initiatives
The DoD's Acquisition Law Advisory Panel went about as
far as one could expect to help implement acquisition reform
from a legislative standpoint from within the Defense
Department. The comprehensive report consists of
approximately 1800 pages, is broken down into eight chapters,
and includes dozens of recommendations. In spite of this
voluminous effort however, there is industry concern that the
Panel's recommendations have not gone far enough. In
particular, industry is concerned with socioeconomic issues
that fail to consider normal industry practices and the issue
of waivers. A specific example was identified whereby the
waiver process was considered to be lengthy and difficult.
A request for waiver of Government clauses in a basic
ordering agreement for standard commercial aircraft spare
parts took four years to process and ultimately provided
only a small part of the relief required to achieve
commercial equivalence [Ref 2:p. 3].
Another issue of great concern to industry is the
Government's propensity for cascading of regulations in
response to Congressional enactment of new statutes. The
Section 800 Panel reviewed this issue and made the following
comment:
While the Panel's charter called for legislative rather
than regulatory reform, there is an important linkage,
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often missed in public and congressional criticism of DoD
contracting methods: Many of the regulations which impose
the most burdensome controls are specifically mandated by
statute. This "missing link" between law and regulation
was addressed in a study specifically prepared for the
Panel by the American Defense Preparedness Association
(ADPA). It found that acquisition laws represented the
apex of a "cascading pyramid" of restrictive regulations,
overly detailed military specifications, and common
procurement practices that typically added 30-50 percent
to the costs of doing business with the Department of
Defense [Ref 10:p. 3).
An industry analysis of the Panel's chapter 8
(Commercial Items) recommendations applauded their efforts but
offered several recommended changes. The thrust of the
industry analysis focused on:
... one of the economic principles underlying the proposed
commercial items statute is that the forces of the
commercial marketplace may be relied upon as much by the
U.S. Government as they are by all other buyers to assure
that prices and terms are fair and reasonable and that the
product quality meets contract requirements (Ref 2:p. 2].
The focus of industry's counter-recommendations is to enhance
the business relationship between the DoD and industry to
become as non-adversarial as possible and provide incentives
to both parties. As previously identified, industry has
expressed concern in regard to the waiver process. "In
industry's experience, the waiver process is lengthy,
difficult, and less than satisfactory" [Ref 3:p. 3]. The
following two examples reflect industry's sentiment:
"* Exemption from TINA and the requirement for cost or
pricing data because many/most commercial companies do not
have accounting systems set up to provide the necessary
data required by Government regulations.
"* Use of uniform terms and conditions that provide for only
those contract clauses determined to be consistent with
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standard commercial practices or required to implement
provisions of the law applicable to commercial item
acquisitions [Ref 2:pp. 2,5].
Congress has attempted to strike a balance between the
needs of both parties, as well as, to preserve the National
good. Title VIII-Commercial Items, of the proposed Federal
Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1993 incorporates many of the
Section 800 Panel recommendations. Specifically:
"* Section 8001 would amend the OFPP Act to add new
definitions of "commercial item, . " nondevelopmental item,
"component," and "commercial component."
"* Section 8002 would add a new section 31 to the OFPP Act to
create a preference for the acquisition of commercial
items and other nondevelopmental items.
"* Section 8003 would add a new section 32 to the OFPP Act to
require the issuance of uniform contract clauses for
commercial item contracts.
"* Section 8004 would authorize the applicability of future
enacted procurement statutes to contracts and/or
subcontracts for the acquisition of commercial items to be
waived on a class basis, through the FAR.
"* Section 8005 would exempt commercial items procurement
from the requirement to identify suppliers and sources of
supplies, the prohibition on contingent fees, the
requirement to identify suspended or debarred
subcontractors...
"* Section 8006 would authorize greater flexibility in
setting deadlines for the submission of offers in
contracts for the purchase of commercial items.
"* Section 8007 would amend the OFPP Act to expand the
responsibilities of OFPP's commercial items advocate and
to give agency competition advocates the added
responsibility of promoting the acquisition of commercial
items and other NDIs.
"* Section 8008 would identify certain provisions that are
not intended to be affected or modified by the Title.
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* Section 8009 would require a Comptroller General review of
Federal Government use of market research [Ref 26:
p. S 14423].
Conversely, the Senate version of the Act did not
adopt several Section 800 Panel recommendations. Some of
these recommendations involved exemptions to the Buy American
Act, special provisions regarding disabled Vietnam veterans
and the handicapped, and exemptions to small business
subcontracting plans [Ref 26:p. S 14423].
As would be expected, industry provided the Senate
Armed Services Committee with an analysis of issues which
echoed many of the same concerns voiced in their previous
analysis (of the Section 800 Panel recommendations). This
analysis identified several "pen-change" type corrections to
the proposed Act, in addition to some more pressing issues.
Exception was taken primarily with portions of Sections 8001,
8003, and 8005 (noted above). In particular, the term NDI
contained in Section 8001 of the Act was determined to have no
appropriate application to commercial item procurements in
their view. Moreover, the industry analysis identified the
term as a "confusing factor when dealing with commercial
products" [Ref 3:p. 22]. Additionally, exception was taken
with the phrase, "inclusion of contract clauses that are
essential for the protection of the Federal Government's
interests in all acquisitions of commercial items" [Ref 3:p.
22]. Industry's concern was based on the perceived practice
of Government officials to broadly interpret regulations to be
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deemed "essential to the protection of the Federal Government"
[Ref 3:p. 22). Finally, the listing of specific exemptions to
statutes contained in Section 8005 caused industry concern.
The industry position was that additional statutes contained
in Section 8005 should be added to the list, e.g., Buy America
Act, Trade Agreements Act, Affirmative Action for Handicapped
Workers, etc., or a blanket waiver should be granted for the
acquisition of commercial products [Ref 26:p. S 14417,
S 14418].
There are many practical and legal issues that have
not been adequately addressed. Given the Administration's
policy of military-commercial integration, it is important
that the Congress closely consider industry's recommendations
in regard to the acquisition of commercial products.
Likewise, compromises may be required by industry. It is
likely that the solution--the language of the Federal
Acquisition Streamlining Act, lies somewhere between the
positions held by industry and that of the Congress. The
reconciliation of a Bill within Congress takes time. Once
enacted, implementation of the contents takes time. If
adjustments are required after implementation, the process of
legislation takes time. Therefore, it is incumbent on all
parties, i.e., Government and industry, to work out a
compromise acceptable to all parties (to the maximum extent
practicable) in as timely a manner as possible. The
underlying goal of the legislation should be to maintain (or
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enhance, if possible) the defense technology industrial base
and to provide DoD with the tools to accomplish its mission,
realizing the many other concerns of the American public,
e.g., jobs, financial stewardship of tax revenues, etc.
Thoroughness -hould override time considerations to the
maximum extent, as well.
As proposed by industry, a Government-industry team
approach to regulatory negotiation for commercial items
regulations would facilitate the process of statute enactment
taking into account the impact on contractors [Ref 3:p. 24].
The proposals from both Government and industry and the
attendant effects of decisions made by the Congress warrant no
less effort. In many cases, such as the shipbuilding
industry, any less effort could result in the loss of portions
of the defense industrial technology base, opportunities to
procure cost-effective material, and possibly jobs within
industry.
C. MEASUREMENT PROCESS AND RESULTS
Three challenges have been identified with the current NDI
measurement process and measurement results. These challenges
involve the reactive nature of the process, the subjective
nature of the process, and finally, the utility of the data.
1. Reactive Nature of the Process
The first challenge with the measurement process is
the reactive nature of the measurement data collection
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process. Measurement of progress in DoD's use of NDI was
established as a requirement in April 1992 [Ref 4:p. 2]. A
year later, in April 1993, the initial data call was
promulgated by the Defense Department [Ref 6:p. 1]. Touted as
an automated process, the initial data call was more of a
manual manipulation of input keyed into a database. A
prepondurance of respondents noted difficulty in amassing the
initial data requested by DoD. These problems were in spite
of the 90-day turnaround requirement. As noted by one
respondent, an extension of nearly an additional 90 days was
required by one Service. The primary problem encountered by
all DoD Services was the identification of "commercial" or
"other NDI" down to the major components of first tier
subsystems. According to one respondent, the field (those
collectiiig and inputting the data) did not fully understand
what the breakdown of percentages meant. In the same Service,
there were many phone calls received from the field that
initially believed the NDI issue to be black or white--it
either was or it was not NDI. The concept of technology
insertion or integration was not fully understood. This may
help explain the deviation noted in the case of ACAT III
percentages for the USN. In only one case had a Service been
collecting any such data. Generally, all respondents were
(unofficially) opposed to future data calls but were resigned
to carry out future collection efforts. The rationale for
opposing future data calls was the inordinate (but
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unspecified) amount of time and effort exerted to collection
of the initial data. A general consensus was established that
future data calls should not differ radically/significantly
from the initial effort. Given the continued requirement for
an emphasis on measurement data one would expect an increase
in both efficiency and effectiveness of the results due to the
nature of the learning curve. However, due to the normal
rotation of assignments, the improvements due to learning may
be cyclical with downward fluctuations upon reassignment of
those individuals responsible for submitting the reports,
e.g., PEOs, PMs, etc.
It is important that DoD consider the impact of having
such a reactive collection process for measuring NDI usage.
There is increasing concern that the acquisition of commercial
products and a measurement mechanism to take full advantage of
a more proactive approach could improve the data's accuracy.
The premise involves the theory that time erodes our memories
and small incremental tasks are often easier to accomplish
than one larger task. However, the goal should be to report
the data as accurately as possible given resource constraints
and not necessarily to have 100% accuracy.
2. Subjective Nature of the Process
The second problem noted with the current measurement
process is the subjective nature of the identification of
"commercial" or "other NDI" in the collection process. All
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respondents noted a rough order of magnitude for initial
measurement statistics due to the subjectivity of the
collection process. The current practice--that determinations
as to what percentages a system is or is not "commercial" or
"other NDI" will be made by the PEO, PM, Army Major
Subordinate Command, Navy Major Systems Command, or Air Force
Major Command assigned responsibility for the system provides
support for the notion of subjective and therefore "rough"
estimates of NDI usage [Ref 6:p. 1 (attachment)]. One method
of reducing the subjectivity of the collection process was
identified in a DoD study. In order to make the process more
objective a recommendation to code parts/part numbers was
identified. This coding would entail manufacturers or
commands exercising configuration control to identify parts as
"commercial," "other NDI," or "other." This proposal was
rejected after a cost-benefit analysis because of a lack of
current and projected resources, i.e., funding, personnel, and
time, to establish and run the program. The upshot of the
proposal is an almost certain increase in the accuracy and
reliability of the report. Another potential benefit of the
proposal would be the future resource savings for the upfront
effort.
Similar to the previous section on the reactive nature
of the collection process, it is essential that DoD consider
the impact of having such a subjective process for measuring
NDI usage. The increased focus on the acquisition of
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commercial products has resulted in the requirement for DoD to
report its progress on measuring the acquisition of commercial
products and other NDIs. Data accuracy has been questioned
primarily due to the prevalent reliance on the subjective
determination of percentages of NDI usage by those responsible
for specific acquisition programs. DoD's goal in this regard
is to report data as accurately as possible given resource
constraints. The introduction of a more objective means to
process the collection of NDI data may increase reporting
accuracy but in all likelihood will increase costs
considerably. It is important that DoD consider the degree to
which they desire NDI data to be accurate.
3. Utility of the Measurement Data
The third problem identified with regard to the NDI
measurement process involves the interpretation and use of the
measurement data. The initial data provide little more than
a baseline snapshot of FY 1992 NDI acquisitions. As one would
expect, the measurement data follow the trend of increasing
NDI percentages as the acquisition category moves from ACAT 1
to ACAT 3. There was a fear expressed by many respondents
that the initial measurement data would become a benchmark to
exceed in future years. A common concern expressed was the
danger facing the DoD if and when Services attempt to "shoe-
horn" in an NDI. Just as in the case of competition, NDI for
the sake of NDI may not necessarily be a good thing. Gaming
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the system in order to meet some preconceived goal may invite
perverse outcomes. One respondent felt that the only
organization that could realistically identify the percentages
of commercial or other NDI was the contractor. Several
respondents noted a potential future problem of passing the
requirement to identify NDI on to the contractor via a
contractor's data requirement list deliverable and the
attendant charge being passed on to the Government. The
current data do not allow for much additional interpretation.
Respondents felt that future analyses should combine
quantitative measurement and qualitative evaluation/analysis.
The rationale for this feeling was that respondents felt that
some valuable results are impossible to quantify [Ref 19:p.
355]. Additionally, respondents noted a preponderance of NDI
at the ACAT IV level and below but stopped short of advocating
collecting such data. During the research, the researcher
found that no clear direction was established for evaluation
of future data. Given that it normally takes several years to
Kevelop adequate measures it should not come as any big
surprise that an agency's first attempt at measurement often
falls short of expectations [Ref 19:p. 349).
The utility of the NDI measurement data is not
addressed in any literature reviewed by the researcher nor was
there any clear understanding of the utility of the data
exhibited by those interviewed. It is important that DoD
consider not only the utility of the data but the motivations
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of those collecting the data when no clear explanation is
given for their future utility. It was generally understood
by the respondents that the initial data collected formed the
baseline of NDI measurement data. However, there was no clear
understanding of what future utility the data held. The
intent of the data is to be used as a measure against which
the Congressionally-mandated NDI acquisition initiatives can
be measured, in the estimation of the researcher. This is
only one measure which is required. Furthermore, future
programs to measure other NDI acquisition initiatives, e.g.,
use of market research, should make adjustments based on the
lessons learned in NDI measurement.
D. THE ACQUISITION PROCESS PARADIGM
Many respondents identified the culture of the acquisition
workforce as the heart and soul of the acquisition reform
movement. The continued use of military specifications in
lieu of functional specifications (in many cases) is a classic
example of a cultural mindset. In spite of the statutory
preference (since 1987) for NDI and the use of functional
specifications, many respondents felt that the DoD had
considerable room for improvement. At least two reasons help
to explain this phenomenon. First, the sheer size of the
acquisition workforce (130,000 positions) creates unparalleled
challenges. Several respondents noted that awareness of new
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initiatives is an associated challenge because of DoD's size.
Training, education, and professional development are yet
other associated problems identified by respondents to
consider with a workforce the size of DoD's. Similarly, the
diversity and geographic separation of the workforce adds
potential challenges. Second, concepts such as "group think"
or "paradigm paralysis" may help explain the reluctance of the
workforce to shift their way of thinking. Paradigm paralysis
can be thought of as a "hardening of the categories," so to
speak [Ref 5:p. 155]. It is normal human nature to resist
change. As Joel Barker writes in Future Edge, "you manage
within a paradigm; you lead between paradigms [Ref 5:p. 164]."
Although the preference for NDI acquisitions has been
around since 1987, the previous paradigm, i.e., the preference
for development programs, continues to be embraced by the
acquisition workforce. As a matter of fact, the hierarchy of
materiel alternatives lists the use of development programs
(3) through (5), behind the use or modification of existing
military systems and the use or modification of existing
commercial or Allied systems that foster cn NDI strategy [Ref
31:p. 1-3]. Times have changed, paradigms have changed but
the attitudes of much of the workforce have not. Many of the
respondents identified that DoD can no longer conduct business
as usual, i.e., preferring developmental programs over
nondevelopmental programs. Sharing lessons learned is another
avenue which could prove fruitful in shifting the paradigm.
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For example, the Marine Corps' acquisition of the Light
Armored Vehicle-25 presented logistical support challenges and
lessons learned worthy of dissemination [Ref 20:p. 1]. Other
examples include innovative contracting techniques for C4I NDI
acquisitions implemented by the Air Force, open systems
architecture advantages in computer acquisitions, and
standardization issues and NDI [Ref 45:p. IV-2, IV-3]. It is
incumbent upon the DoD acquisition leaders to create and
foster a supporting climate in order to shift the way the
workforce looks at the acquisition cycle. Many potential
benefits are in the waiting. It is current DoD policy that
acquisition strategies and program plans shall be tailored to
accomplish established program objectives and to control risk
[Ref 31:p. 1-4]. Further, it is also DoD policy that the
acquisition strategy should be tailored to the extent feasible
to employ commercial practices when procuring commercial
products or other NDIs [Ref 3 3 :p. 6-L-4]..
E. SUMMARY
Legislative issues continue to preclude the DoD from
taking full advantage of opportunities available in the
commercial marketplace. Substantive efforts have taken place
and continue to evolve in this area. NDI acquisitions could
be well-served by enactment of legislation that would reduce
barriers, effectively enhancing the Government-industry
business relationship, while also ensuring public interests
79
are satisfied. Measurement processes are reactive and
subjective. Several alternatives exist that could help/assist
the process to be more proactive, responsive, and objective.
It is not clear what utility is intended for NDI measurement
data. There are several concerns that the initial measurement
data may not represent meaningful data and therefore taint
future evaluation and trend analysis of NDI measurement data.
In a world revolutionized by change, the acquisition process
is changing. To a slower degree, so is the acquisition
workforce. There are many symptoms and causes which must be
addressed and alleviated, not the least of which is training,
education, and professional development. Chapter V presents
the conclusions, recommendations, answers to research
questions, and opportunities for further research.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOHOEENDATIONS
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter summarizes the conclusions and
recommendations resulting from this research. Chapter V
consists of four parts: conclusions, recommendations, answers
to research questions, and areas for further research. First,
the conclusions address regulatory, statutory, training, and
general issues involving NDI acquisitions. Second,
recommendations are provided which specifically address
shortcomings identified during the research. Third, research
questions are answered. Lastly, potential areas for further
research are presented.
B. CONCLUSIONS
1. NDI is not a new topic.
The researcher has concluded, based on a preponderance
of opinions of respondents and the literature review, that NDI
is not a new topic. Respondents unequivocally stated that NDI
was not a new concept. Although the term NDI was not coined
until the mid to late 1980s, commercial product acquisition
was the forefather of what we now classify as NDI. As a
result of the literature review, Tables 1 through 3 were
developed to show the considerable amount of attention which
has been directed at studying commercial product and NDI
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acquisitions. These tables document thirty-four NDI-related
commissions, reports, studies, etc. from 1972 to the present.
2. Impediments to NDI acquisitions continue to exist
despite significant efforts over the past two decades.
The researcher has concluded, based on a preponderance
of evidence gathered from interview responses and the
literature review, that impediments to NDI acquisitions
continue to exist despite significant efforts over the past
two decades. Tables 1 through 3 document many of the
significant efforts which have taken place in the
identification and study of barriers to commercial product and
NDI acquisitions within the DoD. Based on interview responses
however, it was noted that significant progress has been
thwarted by DoD's inability to implement many of the
recommendations made over the years. Moreover, many barriers
continue to exist despite DoD's efforts, because of statutory
mandates. The current Administration's "full court press" on
acquisition reform, to include legislative change, is a
significant indicator of potentially unparalleled future
progress.
3. There are distinct/subtle differences among the DoD
Services; however, these differences play a minor role in
Service implementation of NDI acquisition initiatives.
The researcher has concluded, based on a preponderance
of opinions of respondents and the literature review, that
there are subtle differences among the DoD Services; however,
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these differences play an insignificant role in the Service's
implementation of the NDI acquisition initiatives.
Additionally, conventional wisdom holds that the Services are
quite unique in the missions and roles that they fulfill.
However, when looking beyond the surface, many overlapping
functions and oftentimes missions appear. As many
interviewees stated, it boils down to the hardware that is
procured. The Services oftentimes procure Service-unique
hardware, e.g., tactical fighter aircraft, ships, and
submarines. Conversely, the Services procure many similar
types of products, e.g., communications-electronics equipment,
compuLers, jet engines, power-generating equipment, and
medical supplies. Respondents went on to say that subtleties
often exist due to Service-unique environmental factors, e.g.,
salty sea mist by the U.S. Navy. In the end, respondents
clearly indicated that although subtle differences apply among
the Services, these differences played an insignificant role
in their ability to implement the NDI initiatives of 10 USC
S2325.
4. "Pockets of success" exist, whereby commodities with
established commercial markets and DoD requirements meld to
form a good fit.
The researcher has concluded, based on the
preponderance of opinions of the respondents and conventional
wisdom, that "pockets of success" exist where products conform
to both commercial and DoD applications. Most respondents
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identified several commodities of DoD-required products well-
suited to the commercial marketplace. Given the requirement
to fulfill a specific mission with a commercial counterpart
like-mission, numerous examples of these so-called "pockets of
success" were given, including:






5. Statutory-based impediments still exist and must be
"dealt with" by the U.S. Congress in order to more fully
comply with the NDI acquisition initiatives.
The researcher has concluded, based on the opinion
overwhelmingly shared by all respondents and the literature
review, that statutory-based impediments still exist and must
be "dealt with" by the Congress in order to more fully comply
with the NDI acquisition initiatives. All interview
respondents identified a direct link between DoD's failure to
comply with the mandated NDI acquisition initiatives and the
statutes themselves. Similarly, the literature review
identified numerous examples of barriers to the acquisition of
NDIs steeped in legislation. However, the amount and level of
focus and attention given to legislative reform in the NDI
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arena was clearly seen by all respondents as a step in the
right direction. Although Administration, Congressional, DoD,
and industry participation in these efforts are on-going, most
respondents felt apprehensive in regard to the potential for
"real future progress" based primarily on the past performance
of former efforts in this regard. The focal point of many
respondents was clearly fixed on the Senate's proposed Federal
Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1993.
6. Lessons learned exist and can be more fully applied
across DoD Service boundaries.
The researcher has concluded, based on a preponderance
of opinions of respondents and the literature review, that
many lessons have been learned in the NDI arena. The
preponderance of respondents indicated that it is incumbent
upon the Office of the Secretary of Defense to exploit the
lessons learned associated with NDI acquisitions by Defense
Department Military Services in order to maximize the
efficiency and effectiveness of the Department in this area.
These lessons learned were primarily in the areas of the need
for true legislative reform, increased management/leadership
attention, increased use of functional and performance
specifications and commercial item descriptions, and the need
for increased training in order to shift the acquisition
process paradigm to enhance NDI usage.
7. The definition of minor modification needs to be more
specific.
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The researcher has concluded, based on a preponderance
of opinions of respondents and the literature review, that the
definition of minor modification needs to be more specific and
more readily referenced in literature on the subject, e.g.,
the FAR, DoD Instruction 5000.2, DoD Manual 5000.37-M, etc.
Many of the respondents indicated that the meaning of the term
minor modification was subject to wide interpretation and
judgment. The literature review indicated that the term
"minor modification" appears within the Title 10 definition of
NDI; however, its meaning is not defined. Furthermore, DFARS
211.7001(d) defines minor modification of a commercial item
only. It fails to recognize the entire range of NDIs (already
developed items).
8. NDI training is inadequate to meet the needs of the
acquisition workforce.
The researcher has concluded, based on the opinion
overwhelmingly shared by all respondents that NDI training is
inadequate to meet the needs of the acquisition workforce.
Acquisition workforce positions under the DAWIA umbrella
number 130,000 [Ref 38:p. 167]. DoD Service acquisition
personnel formally trained by the DoD-sponsored NDI training
course number 1641 as of the end of FY 1993. This represents
only 1.26% of the acquisition workforce that has been formally
trained by the two-day NDI Workshop. Many acquisition
professionals may have the requisite knowledge and skill in
this area but a huge void still exists. All interview
86
respondents noted that additional efforts in this area cry out
for attention.
9. NDI acquisitions represent a viable means of acquiring
goods and services.
The researcher has concluded, based on the
preponderance of opinions of respondents and the literature
review, that NDI acquisitions represent a viable means of
acquiring goods and services. NDI acquisitions generally
represent a means to acquire goods and services in less time
and at less cost than development programs. Furthermore, many
respondents stated that when requirements are
defined/specified in terms of function and performance such
that a commercial product or already developed product can be
procured, NDIs foster a value-based approach. As the
literature review indicates, market research plays an
important role in the upfront effort required to identify NDI
alternatives. Similarly, life cycle cost comparisons require
careful upfront analysis. Respondents from both industry and
DoD agreed that the commercial marketplace represents a wealth
of opportunity for Defense Department procurements to take
advantage of a wide range of both high and low technology
developments.
10. The current collection process to measure NDI usage
has inherent weaknesses.
The researcher has concluded, based on the
preponderance of opinions of respondents that the current
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collection process to measure NDI usage has inherent
weaknesses. The collection process used for the initial data
call is both reactive and subjective in nature based on the
comments of respondents in regard to this subject. Many
respondents stated that they experienced problems with
gathering the initial data required. Specifically, they
identified 'he subjective nature of assigning a program as NDI
or not NDI and the degree to which a program used NDIs as a
source of unclear interpretation and subjectivity.
Additionally, only one Service had been collecting any type
of NDI data. Given this fact, most respondents were caught in
a catch-up mode and were reacting to DoD's tasking for NDI
data. By reacting, many respondents felt that their responses
to DoD would not be as accurate as if a more proactive
methodology was used. Time was a critical factor in the
opinions of the respondents.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
1. DoD should concentrate its efforts in training in
order to shift the acquisition process paradigm and afford the
acquisition workforce the tools to identify and process NDI
acquisitions.
Based on the researcher's conclusion that NDI training
is inadequate to meet the needs of the DoD acquisition
workforce, the following recommendation is presented to
enhance DoD's ability to make more effective use of NDI
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acquisitions. Based on the percentage of NDI training
completed by the Defense Department acquisition workforce,
i.e., 1.26% (or 1641 out of a total of 130,000) further
efforts are indicated to indoctrinate, educate, and train the
workforce. A more proactive approach, using a variety of
wider-reaching media would enhance the current two-day NDI
acquisition workshop. Based on the foregoing, specific
recommendations include:
"* Develop a one-hour NDI introductory awareness
videocassette for distribution to all DoD buying
organizations
"* Conduct train-the-trainer workshops (shift the target
audience) to empower buying office supervisors to train
their personnel in a more flexible and tailored manner, as
well as enhancing DoD's ability to "reach the masses"
"* Tailor already existing instruction at DAU-consortium
institutions to require NDI tailoring instruction during
the acquisition cycle portion of courses
"* Expand the number of DoD-sponsored two-day NDI workshops
available at locations around the country
"* Require NDI acquisition training as a mandatory DAWIA
competency
These efforts will require DAU's help in order to foster a
culture which embraces the preference for NDI acquisitions.
Additional key players include the NTI Advocates, their
Associate Advocates, Contracting Officers, and acquisition
leaders in general. DoD can no longer afford to conduct
business as usual considering the evolving global marketplace
and market forces which drive industry practices.
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2. DoD should encourage their acquisition professionals
to manage risk vice being risk-averse.
Based on the researcher's conclusions that impediments
to NDI acquisitions continue to exist despite significant past
efforts and lessons learned exist that can be exploited, the
following recommendation is presented. This recommendation is
not new and is shared by many of the interview respondents and
literature authors. However, the researcher has injected
several potential means to the end--prudent management of
risk. Cost, performance, and schedule risks are present to
varying degrees in every acquisition. These risks are here to
stay. The duty of acquisition managers is to identify risk
factors, attempt to alleviate or reduce the degree of risk,
and finally, to conduct a cost-benefit analysis and make
trade-offs to arrive at a decision. Currently, incentives
favor risk-averse behavior because of fear that taking risks
may lead to program failure, media attention, or worse yet-
relief from duty for cause. Based on the foregoing,
incentives to help break the status quo and encourage risk
management include rewarding PEOs, PMs, etc. for accurate
program reporting and not "advocacy reporting," a renewed
appreciation and fair treatment for acquisition professionals
who exercise prudent business decisions (and which may happen
to fail), and the use of real-life risk management scenarios
as a positive learning/training tool for other acquisition
professionals. Clearly, conventional wisdom holds that
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cultural issues must be addressed to provide incentives to
encourage prudent risk-takers.
3. DoD should revise its NDI measurement process to allow
for a more proactive collection of measurement data via use of
the DD Form 350, Individual Contracting Action Report, on an
as-occurring basis.
Based on the researcher's conclusion that the current
collection process to measure NDI has inherent weaknesses, the
following recommendation is presented. The current collection
process requires an annual report of NDI usage, whereby DoD
requests data collection results by December 1 of each year
[Ref 35:p. 1-5]. Respondents noted that there is no mechanism
in place to collect NDI data on an as-occurring basis. This
process is reactive in nature and +* nds to dilute the validity
of the data due to the time lag, in many cases, between
actively working the procurement package and the reporting
time. Based on the foregoing, DoD should propose an amendment
to DFARS 253.204-70, DD Form 350, Individual Contracting
Action Report (Appendix E). In particular, consideration of
using Block D4D, Other Preference Program and D4E, Premium
Percent or Blocks E4 through E8 for the as-occurring
collection of NDI data would allow for a proactive and
arguably more accurate approach to collecting the data.
Coding of commercial and other NDI categories should also
consider the possibility of also falling under one of the
preference programs contained in D4A, Type of Small Business
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Set-Aside and D4B, Type of Small Disadvantaged Business Set-
Aside Preference.
4. DoD should consider institutionalizing the coding of
parts in order to provide for a more objective measurement of
NDI data.
Based on the researcher's conclusion that the current
collection process to measure NDI data has inherent
weaknesses, the following additional recommendation is
presented. As previously noted, one method of increasing the
objectivity of the NDI acquisition measurement results would
be to systematically code parts and part numbers as
commercial, other NDI, and developmental or other. By coding
parts in such a manner, a more automated or mechanized
approach to measurement could be realized. This system is not
without its drawbacks. The obvious time, personnel effort,
and cost of such a venture should be one decision point. On
the other hand, the long-term benefits of such an approach
must be weighed. Based on the foregoing, using an incremental
implementation approach to this previously studied option may
help solve any previously identified impediments, to include
major upfront expenses. First, new parts would be coded in
the manner noted above. Second, a statistical sampling of
parts would be conducted to identify a second area of
commodity parts to be coded. Third, this process would
continue indefinitely until a significant (to be determined)
amount of parts are coded. This would be in addition to the
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continued emphasis for the use of CIDs and functional and
performance specifications.
5. DoD should continue to support the Section 800 Panel
recommendations and work with the Congress and industry on the
enactment of the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1993.
Based on the researcher's conclusion that statutory-
based impediments still exist and must be "dealt with" by the
Congress in order for DoD to more fully comply with the NDI
acquisition initiatives, the following recommendation is
presented. Realizing that legislative barriers to the
acquisition of NDIs continue to exist and limit the ability of
the DoD to "compete" in the global marketplace, respondents
noted that legislative change is imperative. Based on the
foregoing, careful analysis and consideration of industry
comments to both the Section 800 Panel's Report and more
recently the Senate's proposed Federal Acquisition
Streamlining Act of 1993 (S 1587) is in line with the
Administration's policy of Government and industry working
together for a better America.
6. DoD should improve their efforts to address NDI
upfront to take advantage of already-developed product
opportunities.
Based on the researcher's conclusion that impediments
to NDI acquisitions continue to exist despite significant
efforts over the past two decades, the following
recommendation is presented. The main thrust of this
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recommendation involves the use of market research to identify
NDIs which is mandated in 10 USC S2325. Market research by
both technical and contracting personnel would improve the
chances of identifying NDIs and would therefore realize
significant cost and time savings when procuring products for
DoD. A related issue is the awareness and training of
individuals in market research techniques, as well as in NDI,
in general. In addition to DoD directives, the two-day NDI
acquisition workshop includes instruction in both of these
disciplines. Based on the foregoing, DoD should identify a
measurement plan, to include required data elements, for
market research activities. This measurement would help gauge
the degree of DoD's compliance with the statutory initiative
and help identify the need for any adjustments. Moreover, NDI
strategies should be addressed in the acquisition strategy,
when it is anticipated that NDIs may be available to fulfill
the requirement.
7. DoD should establish a mechanism, e.g., DoD Quarterly
NDI Newsletter, to disseminate NDI policies, issues, lessons
learLed, etc.
Based on the researcher's conclusions that NDI is not
a new topic and that impediments continue to exist despite
significant past efforts, the following recommendation is
presented. Many lessons are learned within the DoD
acquisition workforce yet very few mechanisms are in place to
capitalize on them. The quarterly DoD Standardization
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Newsletter is an example of one of these mechanisms already in
place. By establishing a separate quarterly NDI Acquisition
Newsletter many of the lessons learned in the field could be
shared with the massive DoD acquisition workforce.
Additionally, emerging or little known policies and procedures
could be disseminated; NDI issues of a general nature could be
shared; and DoD Components could be made aware of upcoming NDI
classes, conferences, seminars, reporting requirements, etc.
At a minimum, perhaps the DoD Standardization Newsletter could
expand to allow NDI its own section. By setting NDI
information apart it would allow for easy access and
identification for practitioners to relate to. In other
words, it would make it reader-friendly.
9. DoD should clarify the definition and meaning of minor
modification.
Based on the researcher's conclusion that the
definition of minor modification needs to be more specific,
the following recommendation is presented. Although referred
to in 10 USC S2325, the definition of minor modification is
not addressed within the code. Additionally, DFARS 211.70
defines minor modification of a commercial item only. it
fails to recognize those products already-deve loped and in use
by other Federal, State, and Local agencies. Based on the
foregoing and because of the subjective nature of the
definition expressed by the respondents, DoD should more
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clearly define what they mean by minor modification. An
example of such a definition is:
Minor refers to slightly or less seriously needed changes.
A minor modification, like a requirement, should be cost-
effective, essentially needed, and within scope. The
purpose of "in scope" is to ensure that the change is
needed and does not exceed the Government's requirements.
Therefore, the objective is to enhance the inherent
performance capabilities or characteristics of an already
existing commercial product to meet all of the essential
requirements [Ref 54:p. 113].
D. ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. Primary Research Question: To what extent has the DoD
implemented the NDI acquisition initiatives set forth by
Congress in 10 USC S2325?
NDI acquisition is a viable procurement methodology.
It takes advantage of the potential cost and time savings of
already developed and commercially available products.
However, acquisition of NDIs is not being fully exploited.
The preference for NDI has not achieved greater use because of
a myriad of barriers. These barriers include legislative
issues, cultural issues, and many others associated with the
Government-industry business relationship. A qualitative
assessment of DoD's implementation of the NDI acquisition
initiatives shows that while DoD has attempted to implement
the initiatives, several impediments stand in the way of
anything approaching full implementation. The first
initiative--that the requirements of DoD with respect to a
procurement of supplies are stated in terms of functions to be
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performed, performance required, or essential physical
characteristics, has received considerable attention but
continues to provide room for improvement. The efforts to
convert military specifications and standards to CIDs is an
on-going and magnanimous endeavor. Likewise, the efforts to
train the acquisition workforce in this regard are monumental.
Cultural issues present an underlying challenge to overcome in
regard to this issue, as well. The second initiative--that
such requirements are defined so that NDIs may be procured to
fulfill such requirements, exhibits an area which according to
respondents offered further room for improvement, as well.
Specifically, the requirements generation process and in
particular the requirements definition phase was identified as
an area which required further training emphasis. The third
initiative--that such requirements are fulfilled through the
procurement of NDIs, may be best answered using the data
contained in Table 5. The following results show the total
NDI acquisition usage within the DoD Services for FY 1992:
ACAT I ACAT II ACAT III
11.3% 23.3% 30.7%
Because these data only represent the baseline for NDI usage
they serve little use for identifying the extent of compliance
to the statutory initiatives. What the data do not tell are
the amount of missed opportunities due to improper
requirements definition or specification, inadequate market
research, etc. Finally, the fourth initiative--that prior to
97
developing new specifications, the DoD conducts market
research to determine whether NDIs are available or could be
modified to meet agency needs, represents another area
considered to require additional attention and effort. As
previously discussed, training in market research techniques,
the time available to conduct market research, and management
emphasis of market research illustrate shortcomings identified
by research interview respondents. Additionally, since no
measurement system is available to track market research
efforts, this portion of the initiatives cannot be objectively
addressed.
Based on the gut feelings of all of the respondents,
considerable room for improvement exists--both in terms of
procuring NDI and collecting NDI statistics. Fostering NDI
acquisitions provides potential benefits to both industry (in
the form of increased sales) and DoD (in the form of cost and
time savings over development programs).
2. Subsidiary Question 1: What is an NDI acquisition?
The current statutory definition of NDI is contained
in subparagraph (d) of Appendix B. NDI covers a spectrum of
products ranging from commercially-available products to
already-developed products in use by other Federal, State, or
Local agencies. Additionally, products developed by foreign
countries with which the United States has a mutual defense
cooperation agreement are included. NDI encompasses the
integration of piece parts, components, and subsystems into
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end-products. Additionally, minor modifications to the
products just described also are considered NDI. The
underlying purpose of an NDI acquisition is to take advantage
of already-developed products therefore reducing or
eliminating the time and costs associated with research and
development programs.
3. Subsidiary Question 2: What are the 10 USC S2325 SDI
acquisition initiatives?
The current statutory NDI acquisition initiatives may
be found in paragraph (a) of Appendix B. The four categorical
issues of these initiatives involve the 1) specification of
requirements such that NDIs may be procured, 2) definition of
requirements such that NDIs may be procured, 3) fulfillment of
requirements through the use of NDIs, and 4) use of market
research to determine if NDIs are available before developing
new specifications. Initiatives 1 through 3 were mandated in
the initial legislation (1987) while the initiative to conduct
market research (initiative 4) was mandated in the 1991 DoD
Authorization Act.
4. Subsidiary Question 3: What are the key impediments
in implementing the 10 USC S2325 NDI acquisition initiatives?
A number of studies have been conducted over the years
to identify impediments in regard to the implementation of the
NDI initiatives. Because of economic cycles, the degree to
which these impediments have affected DoD and industry has
fluctuated. In the current downsizing of DoD, which has
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precipitated a resultant loss of budgetary assets, the threat
of losing rnre capabilities in the defense industrial base has
reshaped the way DoD looks at industry and the way that
business must be conducted with them. Most recently, the
Section 800 Panel found that Government-unique business
methods and systems in four areas create the greatest
barriers:
"* Accounting systems
"* Specifications and standards
"* Rights in technical data
"* Government-specific statutes (Ref 3 9:p. 8-71.
Respondents generally concurred with the above barriers and
added cultural issues and the requirements generation process
to the list of NDI acquisition impediments.
5. Subsidiary Question 4: How can DoD Services overcome
these impediments in order to comply with the Congressional
intent of 10 USC S2325?
A variety of approaches are available to overcome
impediments associated with NDI acquisitions. No one approach
may be right or wrong for any given Service. Services should
tailor their approach based on assessments of their own
strengths and weaknesses. However, an aggressive, proactive
training program seems to be the common thread to all
approaches based on interview responses. Besides the
legislative issue, several approaches may be used. The
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following condensed version of a response by one Service
representative to this question best captures the scope of the
effort required to overcome impediments to NDI:
1) Pursue hard cultural changes;
2) Establish a network of Associate NDI Advocates;
3) Hold acquisition improvement seminars ("Road Shows");
4) Review RFPs ("RFP scrubs");
5) Team review of acquisition strategies;
6) Develop performance specification guidebook;
7) Increase (two-way) communication with industry;
8) Develop an appreciation for deterrents to doing
business with DoD; and
9) Emphasize communication with foreign governments.
6. Subsidiary Question 5: How can DoD Services use
(capitalize on) lessons learned by other DoD Services in order
to implement these NDI acquisition initiatives?
DoD does itself a disfavor by not capitalizing on the
use of lessons learned. Lessons learned in a vacuum may help
those organizations involved; however, DoD does not operate in
a vacuum. The Services have documented lessons learned and in
many cases have shared them with each other and DoD as a
whole. Several examples of lessons learned have been
previously identified. A mechanism that could be used to
disseminate lessons learned is a DoD NDI newsletter or similar
media that would be distributed to all buying offices. It
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would additionally solicit comments and articles from the DoD
acquisition workforce.
7. Subsidiary Question 6: Are there specific differences
between Services that have prevented the timely implementation
of the 10 USC S2325 NDI acquisition initiatives? What are
they? (How) can they be overcome?
There are specific differences between the Services;
however, they have not prevented the timely implementation of
the NDI acquisition initiatives. A host of other reasons are
responsible for the Services' dismal implementation status.
Respondents identified subtle differences between the Services
which affected their acquisitions but they were deemed
insignificant. Two issues were raised. First, the
environment in which a particular Service operated affect d
its acquisition decisions. The primary example given by
respondents was the salty sea mist and rolling seas
environment which caused the U.S. Navy to require additional
protection of products due to the environmental hazards, e.g.,
corrosion, of this environment. The second issue concerned
support strategies. The issue centered around where a product
would be supported, e.g., forward-based versus "in the rear"
and by whom it would be supported, i.e., organic support
versus contractor support. In the end, respondents felt that
Service differences play an insignificant role in the
implementation of the NDI initiatives.
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E. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
1. Investigate the progress of legislation in regard to
the Section 800 Panel recommendations for acquisition of
commercial products.
2. Develop a consolidated set of short "case studies"
involving both successful and unsuccessful NDI acquisitions to
be used by DoD as part of a lessons learned library.
3. Conduct a similar study to this for NDI acquisitions
in -•e Defense Logistics Agency.
4. Conduct a similar study to this from the perspective
of potential non-proponents, e.g., Systems Commands, buying
offices, etc., for a bottoms-up look at NDI.
5. Investigate the efforts and progress associated with
the conversion of Military Specifications and Standards to
Commercial Item Descriptions.
6. Conduct statistical analysis of measurement results in
the coming years to identify trends.





AAMS Acquisition Milestone Management System
ACAT Acquisition Category
ACE Armored Combat Earthmover
ADCoP Acquisition & Distribution of Commercial Products
ADPA American Defense Preparedness Assc1.ation
CCAP Commercial Commodity Acquisition Program
CICA Competition in Contracting Act
CID Commercial Item Description
CISP Commercial Item Support Program
COGP Commission on Government Procurement
COTS Commercial Off-the-Shelf
DAC Defense Acquisition Circular
DAU Defense Acquisition University
DAWIA Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act
DFARS Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement
DMR Defense Management Report
DoN Department of the Navy
DoD Department of Defense
DSB Defense Science Board
DSMC Defense Systems Management College
DUSD Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
FAC Federal Acquisition Circular
FAR Federal Acquisition Regulation
FY Fiscal Year
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GAO General Accounting Office
GSA General Services Administration
ILS Integrated Logistics Support
IOC Initial Operational Capability
MDP Milestone Decision Point
MM Manufacturing Modernization
NDI Nondevelopmental Item
OASD Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
OFPP Office of Federal Procurement Policy
PAT Process Action Team
PEO Program Executive Officer
PM Program Manager
RFP Request for Proposal
R&D Research and Development
SAE Service Acquisition Executive
SASC Senate Armed Services Committee
TINA Truth In Negotiations Act
USA United States Army
USAF United States Air Force
USC United States Code
USD (A&T) Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition &
Technology





S 2325. Preference for nondevelopmental items
(a) PREFERENCE.-The Secretary of Defense shall ensure that,
to the maximum extent practicable-
(1) requirements of the Department of Defense with
respect to a procurement of supplies are stated in terms of-
(A) functions to be performed;
(B) performance required; or
(C) essential physical characteristics;
(2) such requirements are defined so that
nondevelopmental items may be procured to fulfill such
requirements;
(3) such requirements are fulfilled through the
procurement of nondevelopmental items; and
(4) prior to developing new specifications, the
Department conducts market research to determine whether
nondevelopmental items are available or could be modified to
meet agency needs.
(b) IMPLEMENTATION.-The Secretary of Defense shall carry out
this section through the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, who shall have responsibility for its effective
implementation.
(c) REGULATIONS.-The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe
regulations to carry out this section.
(d) DEFINITION.-In this section, the term "nondevelopmental
item" means-
(1) any item of supply that is available in the
commercial marketplace;
(2) any previously developed item of supply that is in
use by a department or agency of the United States, a State or
local government, or a foreign government with which the
United States has a mutual defense cooperation agreement;
(3) any item of supply described in paragraph (1) or (2)
that requires only minor modification in order to meet the
requirements of the procuring agency; or
(4) any item of supply that is currently being produced
that does not meet the requirements of paragraph (1), (2), or
(3) solely because the item-
(A) is not yet in use; or




DEFINITION OF NDI FOR MEASUREMENT PURPOSES
[Ref 35:p. 1-2]
NDI (DoD). For the purpose of measurement, NDI more
specifically includes:
1. Commercial items defined as items sold or licensed
to the general public for other than Government
purposes.
2. Commercial items with DoD required modifications
that are options or customizing normally provided to
commercial customers or that relate to item finishing,
packaging, marking, testing, i.e., modifications that
allow DoD items to be supplied from the commercial
production line.
3. Upgrades of previously sold commercial items which
are in production but not yet available to the general
public (prototype and experimental models do not
qualify).
4. Items developed by other military Services, by other
Defense activities, or by other Government agencies.
5. Items developed by foreign governments, which can be
procured in accordance with mutual defense cooperation
agreements and Federal and Department of Defense
acquisition regulations.
6. Items previously developed and produced with DoD
required modifications that enable DoD to satisfy an
acquisition requirement without the need for extensive
R&D or testing; the modified item should be largely
representative of the item in production (i.e., minor
modifications).
7. A system created by integrating NDI subsystems or
components, which requires research and development for
systems engineering and testing- as a minimum- to ensure
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